The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization

Is the WTO Passé?

“…See Maggi and Staiger (2015) where there are no disputes in equilibrium and Beshkar (2010Beshkar ( , 2013 and Maggi and Staiger (forthcoming) where disputes arise in equilibrium. See also Bagwell (2008), Lawrence (2003), and the legal discussion of Schwartz and Sykes (2002). the court does not observe the joint payoff to the two countries under the realization of the state variables.…”

Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy

“…16 One might argue that such a system encourages cheating because there is no penalty for it unless the cheater is caught and still refuses to stop within a "reasonable time." No fully satisfactory explanation for this aspect of the system exists, although Schwartz and Sykes (2002) offer a speculation. They argue that the bulk of disputes involve good faith differences in interpretation of WTO law, and that litigating such disputes to conclusion may create an important positive externality in the form of useful precedent for the hundred-plus other states bound by the same ambiguous "contract."…”

Economics of Public International Law

“…Schwartz and Sykes (2002) offer the suggestion that the members desired to make clear that tariff concessions could be withdrawn if necessary without securing the permission of affected nations beforehand. In a rough sense, they wished to create a "liability rule" rather than a "property rule."…”