The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach

Clark, Colin; Munro, Gordon R.

doi:10.1016/0095-0696(75)90002-9

Cited by 475 publications

(233 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The analysis illustrates an important aspect of managing mixed fisheries under the objective of maximising the net present value of profits, as usually proposed in optimal control or capital theory approach for fisheries (Clark and Munro, 1975), where fish stocks are taken as natural capital assets. Given the biological variability of some of the target resources in a mixed fishery, increased average profits may be associated with increased inter-annual variability in these profits, which may be perceived as a negative outcome by the industry.…”

Section: Implication Of Economic Risk When Managing a Mixed Fisherymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By profitability is meant net present value (NPV) of profits, in line with capital theory and optimal control approach (Clark and Munro, 1975). A mean-variance analysis is used to examine the trade-offs.…”

Section: Bio-economic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The study is based on a dynamic bio-economic modelling approach, in line with capital theory (Clark and Munro, 1975), where fish stocks are taken as natural capital assets and where net present value of profits plays a major role. The analysis is applied to the case of the Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) in Australia.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Risk versus economic performance in a mixed fishery

Gourguet

Thébaud

Dichmont

et al. 2014

Ecological Economics

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:Balancing bio-economic risks and high profit expectations is often a major concern in fisheries management. We examine this trade-off in the context of the Australian Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF). The fishery derives its revenue from different prawn species with different dynamics and recruitment processes. A multi-species bio-economic and stochastic model is used to examine the trade-offs between mean profitability of the fishery and its variance, under a range of economic scenarios, fishing capacities and distributions of fishing effort across the various sub-fisheries that comprise the NPF. Simulation results show that the current fishing strategy diversifying catch across sub-components of the fishery entails a compromise between expected performance and risk. Furthermore, given the current economic conditions, increases in fleet size would improve the expected economic performance of the fishery, but at the cost of increased variability of this performance. Highlights►Balancing economic returns and their variability is a concern in fisheries management. ►Nature of this trade-off is examined for the Australian Northern Prawn Fishery. ►Analyses are based on a multispecies stochastic bio-economic model. ►Fishing effort is allocated between predictable and highly fluctuating components. ►Current effort strategy appears as a compromise between average performance and risk.

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Section: Implication Of Economic Risk When Managing a Mixed Fisherymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Bio-economic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Risk versus economic performance in a mixed fishery

Gourguet

Thébaud

Dichmont

et al. 2014

Ecological Economics

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“…7 5 Taking x 0 > 0 as the initial condition would not ensure the sustainability of extraction activities over t 2 [0; 1) as the stock x (t) would become nil in …nite time. 6 Henceforth, we omit the time argument for brevity. Mangasarian's (1966) and Arrow's (1968) su¢ ciency conditions are also satis…ed.…”

Section: Natural Resources Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power, Resource Extraction and Pollution: Some Paradoxes and a Unified View

Lambertini

Leitmann

2013

Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance

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We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where …rms'output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full- ‡edged model in which (i) the resource is explicitly considered as an input of production and (ii) the natural resource and pollution interact via the respective state equations. This allows us to show that the relationship between the welfare properties of the economic system and the intensity of competition is sensitive to the degree of accuracy with which the model is constructed.JEL codes: C73, H23, L13, O31, Q2, Q3 Keywords: environmental externality, resource extraction, oligopoly, Pigouvian taxation, R&D We would like to thank Roberto Cellini and Arsen Palestini for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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“…8 In order to deduce the standard golden rule equation (see Clark and Munro, 1975) from equation (11), one has to formulate biological equilibrium harvest, introduce the connection between the discount factor and the rate of interest and specify the cost function as…”

Section: Comments On the Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rent-seeking and quota regulation of a renewable resource

Bergland¹,

Clark

Pedersen

2002

Resource and Energy Economics

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The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents' extraction of the resource in the past, even though high exploitation might reduce the stock that future individual quotas will be based upon. Whether aggressive rentseeking behaviour by one agent will encourage other agents to rent-seek more, however, is generally found to be ambiguous. JEL Classification: Q2, D7, C7.Keywords: Rent-seeking, quota regulation, renewable resources. Address for IntroductionIt is well known that agents who share a common-pool resource will not take account of the full social cost of their actions. This means that the non-cooperative solution leads to a suboptimal management of the resource (Gordon, 1954). A usual response to this problem is to attempt to regulate extraction of the resource in some way in order to enforce optimal management. Indirect regulation can be implemented through a system of taxes, whilst direct regulation involves a quantity constraint on production (see for instance the overviews written by Bohm andRussell, 1985 andScott, 1985). In this paper we examine how rational actors' expectations of a direct regulatory regime can influence its efficiency. This type of regulation implies a reduction in the exploitation of the resource for some or all of the actors, according to some pre-specified criterion. Equal rate of reduction is an often-used principle; for instance, a fishery may be regulated by the use of quotas which specify a total allowable catch for each nation. The sizes of the nations' quotas are very often based upon observable and verifiable variables such as historic catch or the number of vessels participating in the different fisheries. These magnitudes can be freely chosen by the nations in an unregulated (free) fishery. When the participants know (or suspect) that resource extraction will be directly regulated, they may have an incentive to adjust their behaviour in anticipation of this, even before regulation is implemented. Imagine that quotas will be awarded on the basis of historic catch, defined over a certain period. The nation can then attempt to secure a larger quota ex post by increasing the size of their catches in the periods leading up to the implementation of regulation. The incentive to over-fish is an example of rent-seeking behaviour which can counteract the efficiency of the regulatory regime. It is precisely this mechanism which is the focus of this paper. We concentrate our analysis on two 2 aspects: first we discuss under which conditions the regulation will lead to over-fishing compared to a welfare optimal allocation and different non-cooperative solutions (situations without any explicit regulation); secondly, we examine the strategic interaction between actors which may arise within the regulatory regime. For instance, one may ask whether ...

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The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach

Cited by 475 publications

References 18 publications

Risk versus economic performance in a mixed fishery

Risk versus economic performance in a mixed fishery

Market Power, Resource Extraction and Pollution: Some Paradoxes and a Unified View

Rent-seeking and quota regulation of a renewable resource

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