The Economics of Health and Health Care

Folland, Sherman; Goodman, Allen C.; Stano, Miron

doi:10.4324/9781315103488

Cited by 71 publications

(78 citation statements)

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“…From the perspective of the patient the perfect agent is seen as one who chooses as the patients themselves would choose if only the patients possessed the same information as the GP (Folland et al, 2006;Gafni et al, 1998). Since other attributes than health are typically included in this principal's utility function, the issue of perfect agency is not limited to apply to health only (Evans & Brown, 1984;Ryan, 1994), but may for example also include levels of co-payment and personal tastes, factors that are not always fully internalised by the GP (Neuman & Neuman, 2009).…”

Section: Patient Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

GPs' implicit prioritization through clinical choices – evidence from three national health services

Riise

Hole

Gyrd‐Hansen

et al. 2016

Journal of Health Economics

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We present results from an extensive discrete choice experiment, which was conducted in three countries (Norway, Scotland, and England) with the aim of disclosing stated prescription behaviour in different decision making contexts and across different cost containment cultures. We show that GPs in all countries respond to information about societal costs, benefits and effectiveness, and that they make trade-offs between them. The UK GPs have higher willingness to accept costs when they can prescribe medicines that are cheaper or more preferred by the patient, while Norwegian GPs tend to have higher willingness to accept costs for attributes regarding effectiveness or the doctors' experience. In general there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity also within each country. We discuss the results from the DCE in the light of the GPs' two conflicting agency roles and what we know about the incentive structures and cultures in the different countries.2

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Section: Patient Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

GPs' implicit prioritization through clinical choices – evidence from three national health services

Riise

Hole

Gyrd‐Hansen

et al. 2016

Journal of Health Economics

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“…It goes without saying that physicians are subject to market forces like other workers, so the prices chosen by health plans are probably best regarded as being determined by demand and supply [7]. Workload is another matter.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of competition on quality of hospital treatment from physician behavior perspective (theoretical model verification with case presentation from Vinnitsa, Ukraine)

Yaremyna

Ocheredko

2017

ScienceRise: Medical Science

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Material and MethodsTo check the deduction stemming from the theoretical model of physician behavior on part of possible impairment of quality under market monopoly we exploited competing risk modeling having in mind 2 types of subsequent admissions:-the same cause as in previous admission; -different cause. It ensures us to use two types of censoring, both informative and non-informative. The non-informative censoring tells on termination of tracing before the next admission. The majority of cases demonstrated non-informative censoring. Informative censoring denotes admission due to the different cause then previous. Absence of censoring refers to subsequent admission due to the same cause as previous. Yet another, third type of censoring related to lethality. It's known as terminal event censoring. It's actually the informative censoring that precludes any following censoring or risk accumulation. If we denote Т ij as j th admission episode in і th patient with the same cause as previous Y ij -with different cause, С ij -censoring because of termination of tracing, each period between successive admissions can be classified by: 1) admission due to the same cause with frailty Z 1 with gamma distribution resulted from sum of independent gamma distributed variables Y 0 and Y 1 ;2) admission due to the different cause with gamma distributed frailty Z 2 resulted from sum of independent gamma distributed variables Y 0 and Y 2 ;3) terminal event with gamma distribution resulted from sum of independent gamma distributed variables Y 0 and Y 3 .The mutual variable Y 0 serves commonality in individual risks. Indeed, all three events induced by health problem of particular patient, the fact captured by Y 0 . To get into practicalities we used:This ensures simple first and second moments of frailties distributions:Therefore, co-variation between Z 1 and Z 2 is:With simple correlation formulae (ρ):Specification of events rendered by particular independent variables Y 1 , Y 2 , and Y 3 . Event specification also ingrained into specific linear predictors.Thereby, competing risks incorporated into mixed proportional hazard model (MPH) by:-censoring system (1), incorporating each admission due to the same cause precludes admission due to the different cause and counterwise; lethality introduces another competing risk that upon happening terminates exposure to competing risks; -expression of Z 1 and Z 2 as gamma distributed with common elements of shape and scale k 0 (2), thereby ensuring certain commonality in risks of competing events under consideration; -correlation coefficient ρ between frailties Z 1 and Z 2 , evaluating competing risks commonalities;-association between frailties Z 1 and Z 2 and frailty of terminal event Z 3 through common Y 0 . Copula.mode <-multivPenal(Surv(Between,Censored1)~ cluster(ID) + T + Dep + Exigent+ Order + Status1 + Holiday + Office + Age + Sex + Occupationc + CharlsonI + Ecallc + dStatus + Monthc + Diagnose1 + event2(Censored2) + terminal(Censored3), formula.Event2 =~ T + Exigent + Status2 +...

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“…Takođe, nisu retki ni takvi osiguravajući sistemi koji u potpunosti zamenjuju državna osiguranja. 3 Međutim, ceo sistem zdravstvene zaštite ima nekoliko ozbiljnih poteškoća ispred sebe. Jedan od suštinskih problema s kojima se Evropa u celini suočava, jeste starenje stanovništva.…”

Section: Metode Radaunclassified

Uticaj privatnog zdravstvenog osiguranja na makroekonomski ambijent Republike Srbije

Zekić¹,

Šegrt²

2015

Oditor

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Rezime:Osnovni cilj ovog rada je ocena mogućnosti za efikasno širenje tržišta privatnih zdravstvenih osiguranja na teritoriji Republike Srbije, i socijalni i ekonomski impakt koji bi ekspanzija ovog tržišta imala. Dobro privatno zdravstveno osiguranje, njegova dobra saradnja i partnerstvo sa državnim zdravstvenim osiguranjem, kao i uklanjanje birokratskih prepreka za širenje tržišta privatnog zdravstvenog osiguranja, doprineće boljem zdravstvenom sistemu, boljim uslugama u zdravstvu, povećanju zdravlja, radnih sposobnosti, bogatstva, a samim tim i ekonomije i socijalne strukture cele države. Imajući u vidu činjenicu da obavezno zdravstveno osiguranje u Republici Srbiji ne može da pruži sve usluge svima, što je slučaj i u većini zemalja na svetu, javlja se potreba za uvođenjem alternativnih oblika zdravstvenog osiguranja. Privatno zdravstveno osiguranje kao jedna alternativa, polako ulazi u sistem zdravstevne zaštite Republike Srbije, sa mogućnošću daljeg razvijanja i dostizanja mnogo većih dimenzija.Ključne reči: zdravstveno osiguranje, privatno zdravstveno osiguranje, osiguravajuće kompanije.

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The Economics of Health and Health Care

Cited by 71 publications

References 0 publications

GPs' implicit prioritization through clinical choices – evidence from three national health services

GPs' implicit prioritization through clinical choices – evidence from three national health services

The influence of competition on quality of hospital treatment from physician behavior perspective (theoretical model verification with case presentation from Vinnitsa, Ukraine)

Uticaj privatnog zdravstvenog osiguranja na makroekonomski ambijent Republike Srbije

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