The Economics of Spectrum Sharing

McHenry, Giulia; Bazelon, Coleman

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2242008

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…The spectrum value opportunity is calculated by the population that each MHz of spectrum reaches (MHz-POP). In our model, we will assume that the value of this band is $1 per MHZ-POP which is the same value that had been used in McHenry and his colleagues work [11]. The LTE required bandwidth by the ITU is 20 MHz, but we will use the available bandwidth for the band 1695-1710 MHz which is 15 MHz.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ex-Post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing

Malki

Weiss

2014

SSRN Journal

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Spectrum sharing is emerging as a key strategy for future wireless communications systems. Enforcement is a requirement for spectrum sharing to protect the incumbent of the spectrum from bad interference. Practical schemes have linked together ex-ante and ex-post enforcement. The design of the overall enforcement system may give more emphasis to one or the other. The emphasis in commercial-government sharing in the United States has been on ex-ante measures [4,5]. Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a spectrum sharing scheme is of significant importance since spectrum sharing will inevitably result in interference events. To evaluate the role of the ex-post enforcement approach, we will consider numerical examples where we compare the cost of the ex-post only enforcement to the cost of the ex-ante only enforcement on one of the suggested bands for spectrum sharing (1695-1710 MHz). The cost of the ex-post enforcement in our model depends on the penalty value that Primary User (PU) uses to control interference events and the probability of detecting the interference. The penalty value depends on two factors which are changeable and unchangeable enforcement costs. The cost of the ex-post only enforcement has two variables that affect it, which are probability of detection; and the changeable enforcement cost. The numerical results show how these two variables affect one another, and their effect on the radius of the penalty zone. It also shows the maximum changeable enforcement cost that would be feasible.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%