The Effect of Cognitive Control on Different Types of Auditory Distraction

Abstract

Deviant as well as changing auditory distractors interfere with short-term memory. According to the duplex model of auditory distraction, the deviation effect is caused by a shift of attention while the changing-state effect is due to obligatory order processing. This theory predicts that foreknowledge should reduce the deviation effect, but should have no effect on the changing-state effect. We compared the effect of foreknowledge on the two phenomena directly within the same experiment. In a pilot study, specific foreknowledge was impotent in reducing either the changing-state effect or the deviation effect, but it reduced disruption by sentential speech, suggesting that the effects of foreknowledge on auditory distraction may increase with the complexity of the stimulus material. Given the unexpected nature of this finding, we tested whether the same finding would be obtained in (a) a direct preregistered replication in Germany and (b) an additional replication with translated stimulus materials in Sweden.

When is forewarned forearmed? Predicting auditory distraction in short-term memory.

“…These results are consistent with the duplex-mechanism account: A forewarning eliminated the effect of a deviant because this effect is underpinned by aspecific attentional diversion caused by the violation of a predictive model. That is, the forewarning 2 Bell et al (2017) reported that the effect of a deviant was not reduced by foreknowledge and concluded that this finding "disconfirms the prediction of the duplex model that the deviation effect is more amenable to cognitive control than the changing-state effect" (p. 366). However, the deviant in Bell et al's study only produced a very small performance decrement (around 2-3%) whereas the decrement in the relevant experiment of Hughes et al (2013, Experiment 2) was around 10%.…”

“…However, the deviant in Bell et al's study only produced a very small performance decrement (around 2-3%) whereas the decrement in the relevant experiment of Hughes et al (2013, Experiment 2) was around 10%. As the authors themselves have pointed out (Bell et al, 2017;Röer et al, 2015), it would be difficult to observe a benefit of foreknowledge on distraction if the amount of distraction is very small in the first place. This discrepancy in the size of the deviation effect may be due to the use of a (probably more salient) deviation in voice in Hughes et al (2013) as opposed to a word-deviation (e.g., "fall, fall, fall, dog...") in Bell et al (2017).…”

“…As the authors themselves have pointed out (Bell et al, 2017;Röer et al, 2015), it would be difficult to observe a benefit of foreknowledge on distraction if the amount of distraction is very small in the first place. This discrepancy in the size of the deviation effect may be due to the use of a (probably more salient) deviation in voice in Hughes et al (2013) as opposed to a word-deviation (e.g., "fall, fall, fall, dog...") in Bell et al (2017). In line with this interpretation, the voice-deviation effect has been found to have an effect size (Cohen's d) in the range of .82 -1.67 (based on four experiments reported by Hughes et al, 2007Hughes et al, , 2013 whereas the word-deviation effect (based on the three experiments reported in Bell et al 2017) is consistently much smaller (Cohen's d in the range .32 -.49).…”

“…We have argued that such stimulus-aspecific attentional diversion occurs to the extent that a sound is perceived as not belonging to an already established stream; that is, it diverts attention because it violates the current preattentively-generated model of the auditory scene (e.g., Hughes, 2014;Hughes & Jones, 2003;Hughes et al, 2005;Vachon, Hughes, & Jones, 2012; see also Sussman, Horváth, Winkler, & Orr, 2007;Winkler & Schröger, 2015). This conceptualization of aspecific attentional diversion differs in two important ways from that in the attentional diversion account of the changing-state effect (Bell et al, 2017;Röer et al, 2015): First, as noted, we argue that the process of integrating sounds into a stream-which forms the context against which a sound can divert attention-is preattentive; it does not, therefore, consume attentional resources away from focal task processing. Second, stimulus-aspecific attentional diversion occurs when a sound is perceived that cannot be integrated into an already established stream whereas the changing-state effect arises due to the perception of changes within an already established stream.…”

Testing, Testing, 1 2 3: Exploring the Mitigating Effects of Sound on Test Performance

“…If the student's anxiety increased and performed better in the ambient sound condition which was meant to elicit more anxiety, the student may have performed better because their situation was mood-congruent (DeMarco, Taylor, & Friedman, 2015) and potentially more familiar. It may have been easier to perform because they already had the expectation that other people would disrupt their performance and therefore found it easier to focus regardless of whether their anxiety was increased or decreased across conditions (Bell et al, 2017). However, if the participant came in with high anxiety they were more likely to perform worse in the ambient sound condition and better in the silence condition (see figure G2 in appendix G).…”