The Effect of Election Outcomes on the Allocation of Government Spending in Japan

Local economic impacts of legislative malapportionment

“…To probe these two possibilities, we calculate (1) the vote share of the ruling party to capture the effects of patronage and (2) Batrik industry shift-share to proxy for local economic conditions. There are compelling anecdotes as well as statistical evidence that patronage is an important factor in the formulation of the LDP's economic policies in Japan (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1994, Meyer and Naka, 1999, Tamada, 2009, Catalinac, de Mesquita, and Smith, 2018. Similarly, Bartik industry shift-share is widely considered as a strong predictor of local economic performance (e.g., Bartik, 1991, Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Bound and Holzer, 2000, Imai and Takarabe, 2011, Kerwin, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018.…”

The Effect of Government Purchases on Economic Growth in Japan

“…As the economy slowed, there was much less emphasis on constraining debt, and expenditures were no longer bound by the taxes collected. As Tamada (2009) demonstrated, government spending in Japan had a significant effect on voting patterns. This would suggest that government investment purchases was less likely to have as significant of an economic return.…”

A Tournament Theory of Pork Barrel Politics: The Case of Japan

“…Indeed, the secondary literature in Japanese politics furnishes a wealth of evidence consistent with the tournament theory. LDP politicians typically adopt personalistic campaign strategies, whereby they rely on the vote mobilization efforts of an assiduously cultivated personal group of supporters called a “koenkai” (e.g., Fukui & Fukai, 1996, 1999; Hirano, 2006, 2011; McMichael, 2018; Reed, 1986; Saito, 2009, 2010; Scheiner, 2005, 2006; Tamada, 2009). They use the promise of central government money to convince municipal and prefectural politicians, as well as other community leaders, to join their koenkai and assist in vote mobilization.…”