The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures

Chen, Jowei

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00432.x

Cited by 27 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Finally, we explore whether members of state delegations benefit when, in conjunction with the theories outlined above, another member of the delegation holds a position of power, is electorally vulnerable, or is a member of the majority party. Given that members of state delegations have incentives to work together to secure benefits for their respective states, we posit that these intrastate working relationships may increase the likelihood that multiple members of a state's delegation benefit from a single member's institutional, partisan, or electoral advantage in the procurement of earmarks (Chen 2008). In the Senate, the combined effects of relatively weak party organizations and institutional hierarchies make intrastate cooperation a viable strategy for senators looking to marshal strength in numbers.…”

Section: Intrastate Spillover Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Lazarus

Steigerwalt

2009

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.

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Section: Intrastate Spillover Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Lazarus

Steigerwalt

2009

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…In the United States Primo and Snyder (2010), for example, show that those areas of the US where a party clearly dominates, attract less attention in terms of distributive spending, because of a decreased incentive for individual legislators to secure a 'personal vote' via local projects. More examples of pork-barrelling have been described by Chen (2010) in the case of New York, who proves that the electoral geography of legislative districts affects pork-barrelling under bicameralism. He indicates that greater electoral fragmentation has a negative effect on porkbarrelling.…”

Section: Pork-barrel Politics and Public Investment 21 Politics And mentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberals, Socialists, and pork-barrel politics in Greece

2016

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This paper analyses the role of pork-barrel politics in the allocation of public investment expenditures in Greece. It proposes a model which explicitly relates the allocation of public investment to electoral results using a unique dataset covering the period from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until 2009, just before the Great Recession that radically transformed the political panorama of the country. The analysis includes ten legislative periods marked by governments of the two parties that dominated the political arena in Greece: the Liberal and the Socialist Party. The results show that Socialist and re-elected governments applied more expansionary fiscal policies relative to Liberals. The two main parties also used different tactics when it came to pork-barrelling: while the Socialists when in government rewarded/groomed their electoral fiefs, the Liberals invested in areas controlled by the opposition to win over new votes or seats.

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“…Such pork-barrel spending gives rise to inefficiencies. 2 1 Intergovernmental grants may also be influenced by direct democracy (Feld and Schaltegger 2005), voter turnout (Martin 2003), lobbying by local politicians (Borck andOwings 2003, Dalle Nogare andKauder 2016), the electoral geography of districts (Chen 2010), and legislative representation (Knight 2008). See Curto-Grau et al (2012) on the distribution of spending in semi-democratic Spain.…”

Section: Prior Studies and Our Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program

Kauder

Potrafke

Reischmann

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate whether politicians award intergovernmental grants to core supporters. Our new dataset contains information on discretionary project grants from a German state government to municipalities over the period [2008][2009][2010][2011]. The results show that discretionary grants were awarded to municipalities with many core supporters of the incumbent state government. Discretionary grants per capita increased by about 1.4 percent when the vote share of the incumbent party in the state election increased by one percentage point. The fiscal capacity of a municipality does, by contrast, not predict the level of discretionary grants. We propose to trim discretionary project grants to the benefit of formula-based grants. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Codes: D720, H720, H770, H810.

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The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures

Cited by 27 publications

References 23 publications

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Liberals, Socialists, and pork-barrel politics in Greece

Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program

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