The effect of feedback and recollection rejection instructions on the development of memory monitoring and accuracy

Moore, Kara N.; Lampinen, James Michael; Nesmith, Blake L.; Bridges, Ana J.; Gallo, David A.

doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105434

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…In this study, children's understanding of the subjective aspects of recollection is related to their metamemory capacities. Crucially, such metamemory capacities have been found to develop in response to the kind of teaching, feedback, and training that is provided by parents in the context of joint reminiscing (Moore, Lampinen, Nesmith, Bridges, & Gallo, 2022;Ghetti & Castelli, 2006;Poole & Lindsay, 2002). Heyes et al (2020) identify three aspects of (explicit) metacognition that are good candidates for being socially learned: discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting.…”

Section: Social Origins Of Mnemicity Attributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Social feedback by individuals who are already “mnemicity experts” can provide social scaffolding here. Indeed, parents frequently provide feedback (“you couldn't remember this”; Moore et al., 2022) or memorability cues (“you would remember this”; Castelli & Ghetti, 2014) of the kind shown to improve children's metamemory capacities. Further, however, the learner needs to understand which concepts to apply in interpreting the features of their simulations.…”

Section: Individual Aspects Of Mnemicity Attributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Mahr

2023

Topics in Cognitive Science

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Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions—most prominently according to their “mnemicity”: we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are “remembering” or “imagining”). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because—for humans—the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals’ remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

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