The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe

Moraski, Bryon; Loewenberg, Gerhard

doi:10.2307/2647779

Cited by 56 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Are representatives of the old regime penalized more generally, or are our results specific to the postcommunist world? Evans and Whitefield 1995;Grzymala-Busse 1998, 2001, 2002aIshiyama 1995Ishiyama , 1996Ishiyama , 1997Ishiyama , 1998Ishiyama , 1999aIshiyama , 1999bIshiyama and Bozóki 2001;Mahr and Nagle 1995;Moraski and Loewenberg 1999;Orenstein 1998;Waller 1995;and Ziblatt 1998. Many more articles focusing on individual CSPs could be cited.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communist Successor Parties And Coalition Formation In Eastern Europe

Druckman¹,

Roberts²

2007

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One of the most distinctive features of new democracies is the presence of political parties associated with the old, repressive regime. This article investigates whether or not the Eastern European variant of these parties, which we call communist successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition politics. It finds that CSPs do have significant effects on the dynamics of coalition formation. CSPs are less likely than other parties to be included in governing coalitions; coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to be oversized (that is, to include superfluous parties); and CSPs that make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive less than their fair share of governing portfolios. We attribute these results to the salience of the regime divide—the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of communism. Our results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern European contexts and show how affective dislike combined with vote‐seeking motivations can affect governing behavior.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communist Successor Parties And Coalition Formation In Eastern Europe

Druckman¹,

Roberts²

2007

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In contrast to the long-term political consequences of electoral laws, which have been the subject of numerous major theoretical works (Duverger, 1963;Rae, 1967;Taagepera and Shugart, 1989;Lijphart, 1994), empirical electoral heresthetics have largely focused on case studies. Examples of recent theoretically-oriented books and papers include Bawn (1993), Cox (1997), Moraski and Loewenberg (1999), Boix (1999) and .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93

Kamiński¹

2002

Journal of Theoretical Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Electoral reforms had profound political consequences for post-communist Poland. The majoritarian system helped to accelerate the fall of communism, while later changes to the electoral law helped the former communists reclaim power. Despite the high stakes and top priority given to electoral design by political players, their efforts at manipulation were hardly rewarded. Although the political parties were ex ante seat-maximizers, they supported the electoral law that ex post would have given them the most seats about as frequently as they supported its closest competitor. The reasons for their miscalculations included a lack of methodological expertise, unexpected shifts in voter preferences, transition-speci®c poll biases and new entrants and coalitions that emerged in the period between the introduction of the new electoral law and elections. No signi®cant differences among the various kinds of parties were found. The results do show that the effectiveness of manipulation increased strongly over time.

show abstract

“…It turned out to be a smart thing for the parties to do-19 additional parties got into the Duma this way (77 seats were captured by the independents). On the other hand, PR thresholds turned out to be a prohibitive barrier, as they were elsewhere in the region (Moraski and Loewenberg 1999), letting through only four parties.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gaining Legislative Control Through Strategic District Nomination: The Case of the Russian Left in 1995

Shvetsova

2002

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The greater the importance of the legislative goals for a party, the more it will concern itself in the electoral campaign with the parliament's ultimate composition, rather than simply its own seat gains. While unquestionably the dominant force in the political left, the Communist Party in Russia was also uniquely positioned in the 1995 election to take advantage of the combination of electoral and parliamentary institutions and to devise a nomination strategy that made the rest of the parliament's left wing fully dependent on the Communists, thus giving the Communists effective control over the legislature despite their minority status.

show abstract

The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe

Cited by 56 publications

References 18 publications

Communist Successor Parties And Coalition Formation In Eastern Europe

Communist Successor Parties And Coalition Formation In Eastern Europe

Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93

Gaining Legislative Control Through Strategic District Nomination: The Case of the Russian Left in 1995

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About