The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Access to Paid Leave and Work Absences

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTWe evaluate the impact of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates on labor market outcomes, the utilization of health care services, and health behaviors for private sector workers in the United States. By exploiting geographic and temporal variation in PSL mandate adoption, we compare changes in outcomes for workers in counties affected by a PSL mandate to changes for those in counties with no mandate. Additionally, we rely on within-county variation in the propensity to gain PSL following a mandate to estimate policy effects for workers most likely to acquire coverage. Results indicate that PSL mandates lead to increased access to PSL benefits, especially for women without a college degree. We find that PSL laws reduce average weekly hours worked and private sector employment, but appear to have no effect on job tenure or labor force participation. PSL mandates are associated with sizable reductions in emergency department utilization and increases in general practitioner visits. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that PSL mandates lead to more days binge drinking. JEL Classification Codes: I18, I12, J21, J23, J32Key Words: Paid sick leave, labor market, health care, health behaviors Acknowledgments:

Paid sick-leave and physical mobility: Evidence from the United States during a pandemic

“…One possible explanation is that PSL mandates are used to care for a sick child. Additionally, Callison and Pesko (2020) find evidence that PSL mandates reduce presenteeism (i.e., working while sick) by 4.5 ppts. Similarly, a study shows that the Washington state PSL mandate reduces presenteeism by eight ppts for employees in the retail and food service industries (Schneider 2020).…”

“…These mandates do not reduce employment, wages, or non-mandated benefits (Maclean, Pichler, and Ziebarth 2020;Pichler and Ziebarth 2020). However, PSL mandates increase workplace absences overall (Maclean, Pichler, and Ziebarth 2020;Callison and Pesko 2020;Schneider 2020;Colla et al 2014;Ahn and Yelowitz 2016), and several studies are able to evaluate heterogeneity in which types of workplace absences increase post-mandate. Stearns and White (2018) find that PSL mandates adopted in Connecticut and Washington, DC increase illness-related work absences, but do not increase work absences for non-illness reasons (e.g., childcare).…”

“…Using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),Callison and Pesko (2020) find below the mean PSL coverage rates for employees in the agriculture/forestry/fishing, construction, arts/entertainment, and accommodation/food services industries.3 We note that Maclean and colleagues only focus on private employees, the target group for PSL mandates.…”

The effects of paid sick leave on worker absenteeism and health care utilization

“…Our preferred matching estimates suggest a 22 percentage‐point (51%) increase in the probability of taking sick leave and 1.7 additional sickness absence days per year (59%). These effects fall into the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates in Ahn and Yelowitz (2016; 1.2 annual days) but are smaller in magnitude than reported by Callison and Pesko (2017; 2.5 percentage‐point or 140% increase in the likelihood of absenteeism). However, differences in outcome construction, sample selection, and empirical strategy make it difficult to directly compare our estimates to those from existing studies.…”

“…Pichler and Ziebarth (2018) found no evidence of a statistically significant effect of such mandates on employment and wages. Callison and Pesko (2017) reported large increases in absenteeism among workers who gained PSL under the mandates but decreases in work absences among workers likely to have PSL. Stearns and White (2018) found decreases in absences when examining PSL mandates in Washington, D.C. and Connecticut.…”