The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda

Baird, Vanessa A.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00275.x

Cited by 45 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…These results are significant at the .05 level on a one-tailed test, which is appropriate since the anticipated effect is directional. These results are consistent with Baird's (2004Baird's ( , 2006 results, which produced similar findings in relation to signaling more generally-that is, beyond dissenting signals and signals in relation to only federal-state power. Re-running these results allows for an examination of the relative level of sensitivity of the four measures and the differences of the effects of the different assumptions about judicial behavior, in application.…”

Section: Applying the Measures To An Empirical Analysissupporting

confidence: 82%

Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome Determination

Jacobi

2009

Journal of Legal Analysis

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Forming a coalition on a multi-judge panel involves an inherent trade-off between coalition maximization and ideological outcome optimization. Much scholarship is premised on assumptions about how judges make that trade-off; these assumptions have consequences for how we view and measure judicial decision-making. Specifying these assumptions, formally modeling their effects, and basing measures of judicial behavior on these results offer the potential to improve analysis of judicial decision-making.This article formally explores three commonly posited modes of judicial decision-making: a minimum winning coalition model, representing attitudinalist views of judicial decision-making; a maximum winning coalition, capturing the effect of norms of joint opinion writing and collegiality; and a strategic model, incorporating the concept of the credibility of a marginal justice's threat to defect from a majority coalition. Each model yields comprehensive predictions of case outcome positions and coalition sizes under given Court compositions; the Rehnquist Court and Roberts Courts are examined here. The models are then operationalized as measures for empirical use. The different impact of the three measures is illustrated by re-running Baird and Jacobi's analysis of judicial signaling on case outcomes using each measure.

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Section: Applying the Measures To An Empirical Analysissupporting

confidence: 82%

Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome Determination

Jacobi

2009

Journal of Legal Analysis

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“…We should point out that our argument that organized interests will respond to citation-based signals of demand from the Court dovetails with Baird's (2004) research on how the Supreme Court signals demand for certain kinds of cases. Specifically, Baird finds that when the Court issues a salient decision in a particular issue area, it signals demand for cases in this issue area.…”

Section: Signaling Demand For Amicus-provided Informationmentioning

confidence: 91%

The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Market for Information at the U.S. Supreme Court

Hansford

Johnson²

2014

Justice System Journal

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“…10 While little work directly explores the link between the public's evaluation of what issues are most important and a similar evaluation of issue importance by judges, Baird's (2004) work on information signaling by the Supreme Court provides some evidence of shared perspectives. Due to the variation Project at the University of Texas at Austin (http://www.policyagendas.org/).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Deference Depend on Distinction? Issue Salience and Judicial Decision-Making in Administrative Law Cases

Fix

2014

Justice System Journal

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Judicial deference to administrative agencies is often viewed as a dichotomous choice between full deference and no deference, ignoring considerations of institutional and political context. I argue that a court's decision on whether to defer to an administrative agency is more complex and is conditional on the political salience of the substantive issue in the case. I test this theory in the context of the U.S. Courts of Appeals using a sample of cases decided between 1961 and 2002. The results show that when dealing with non-salient cases, the level of deference to agencies is static, but in salient cases the level of deference is strongly related to the ideological congruence between the court and the agency.Every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there is dictatorship. In particular, it is a stringent requirement that a discretion should be exercised for a proper purpose, and that it should not be exercised unreasonably. In other words, every discretion cannot be free from legal restraint; where it is wrongly exercised, it becomes the duty of the courts to intervene. The courts are the only defense [sic] of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggression. In these days when government departments and public authorities have such great powers and influence, this is a most important safeguard for the ordinary citizen: so that the courts can see that these great powers and influence are exercised in accordance with law. 1 We accord deference to agencies . . . because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows. 2 1 Raja Azlan Shah Ag. CJ writing for the Federal Court of Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia] in Pengarah Tanah dan Galian,

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The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda

Cited by 45 publications

References 24 publications

Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome Determination

Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome Determination

The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Market for Information at the U.S. Supreme Court

Does Deference Depend on Distinction? Issue Salience and Judicial Decision-Making in Administrative Law Cases

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