The Effect of Prepaid Postage on Turnout: A Cautionary Tale for Election Administrators

Abstract

In collaboration with local election officials, we conducted a randomized field experiment in which postagepaid envelopes were provided to a random sample of 10,000 permanent vote-by-mail (VBM) voters in San Mateo County, California, in advance of the November 2, 2010, general election. We find that the treatment generated statistically significant but unexpected effects: postage-paid envelopes increased the probability that voters cast their ballots in person and decreased the probability that they cast their ballots by mail. These offsetting effects meant that the intervention produced no net change in voter turnout. We find that this pattern of countervailing effects is strongest among voters who frequently voted by mail in the past, those potentially most susceptible to disruptions in routine. Post-election interviews support the idea that the postage-paid envelopes created confusion for some voters. The results suggest that reforms designed to increase turnout by decreasing voting costs may have the unintended effect of disrupting routines. F or decades, scholars have conjectured that voter turnout rates would rise if the costs of voting were reduced. Early research (Key 1949) considered tangible costs, such as poll taxes; later authors (Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen 1967; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978) focused primarily on transaction costs, such as the inconvenience of registering to vote well in advance of an election. Recent years have seen a revival of this line of research in the wake of policy innovations designed to make voting more convenient:

Postal delivery disruptions and the fragility of voting by mail: Lessons from Maine

“…Scholars have documented the growth in mail voting (Biggers and Hanmer, 2015; Gronke, 2013), the mechanics by which voting by mail and in-person voting differ (Ewald, 2009; Mann, 2014), how VBM ballots are returned (Menger and Stein, 2020), who switches to mail voting (Monroe and Sylvester, 2011; Smith and Sylvester, 2013), the compositional or turnout effects that occur when voters are offered the convenience of voting by mail (Barber and Holbein, 2020; Berinsky, 2005; Dubin and Kalsow, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2005; Hanmer and Traugott, 2004; Oliver, 1996; Patterson and Caldeira, 1985; Stein, 1998; Thompson et al, 2020), and, more broadly, whether voters in response to stimuli change how they cast their ballots (Hanmer et al, 2015; Hassell, 2017; Herron and Smith, 2014; Michelson et al, 2012).…”

Polling place changes and political participation: evidence from North Carolina presidential elections, 2008–2016

“…If voters are risk averse, or value their vote highly, moving a polling place may cause voters to vote early in response. Prior work has indeed found evidence that voters shift between modes of voting rather than forgo casting a ballot when there are changes in the procedures for a particular mode of voting (Malhotra et al , 2011; Michelson et al , 2012). Voters may choose to vote early rather than risk the uncertainties of dealing with a new polling place on Election Day.…”

Enlisting the Public in Facilitating Election Administration: A Field Experiment

“…A study by Michelson et al () comes closest to our own question: what incentives do voters need to return their mailed ballots by mail over returning them in person? A random sample of permanent VBM voters in San Mateo County, California, were sent a postage‐paid envelope as an incentive to return their mailed ballot by mail rather than in person.…”

“…Previous efforts to steer how voters cast their ballots have relied primarily on a narrow set of messages describing the incentives to voters of using new voting opportunities. This messaging, which describes to voters the savings and convenience of using new voting methods, has produced mixed results (Michelson et al ; Monroe and Sylvester ). Drawing on Schneider and Ingram's () description of policy tools, we suggest that messages designed around appeals to authority and symbolism may be more persuasive to voters than those describing direct incentives.…”