The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods

Sefton, Martín; Shupp, Robert; Walker, James M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.932683

Cited by 256 publications

(360 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…One reward point costs 1 money unit and the rewarded group member then gets, depending on the experiment, one or more money units as an additional payment. The results suggest that this mechanism can also stimulate contributions, in particular if the rewarded individual receives more than what it costs to reward (Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 2007;Rand et al 2009;Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher 2010). For example, in experiments comparable to Gächter et al (2008) summarized in Figure 4, Rand et al (2009) showed that achieved cooperation levels were as high as those under punishment.…”

Section: The Determinants Of Social Order Iii: Punishment and Other Imentioning

confidence: 92%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualised as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research.

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Section: The Determinants Of Social Order Iii: Punishment and Other Imentioning

confidence: 92%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

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“…In this respect, it is interesting to note that many researchers implicitly assume such an equalcontributions norm when they analyze punishment behavior in public good games. For example, it is commonly assumed that punishment is motivated by deviations from either the average contribution Gächter, 2000, 2002;Anderson and Putterman, 2006;Sefton et al, 2007), the punisher's contribution (Gächter et al, 2008;Egas and Riedl, 2008;Sutter et al, 2008), or both (Masclet et al, 2003;Masclet and Villeval, 2008;Nikiforakis, 2008). In all these cases an equal-contributions norm is assumed.…”

Section: Focal and Conflicting Contribution Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben

Riedl

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

280

211

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations AbstractEconomic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.JEL Code: H41, C92, Z13.

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“…Positive incentives become costly, but negative cheap, if success is fully achieved, i.e. all cooperate [10,[69][70][71].…”

Section: Box 4: the Carrot: The Role Of Rewards As Incentives For Coomentioning

confidence: 99%