The effect of risk sensitivity on a supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and quality investment

Avinadav, Tal; Chernonog, Tatyana; Perlman‬‏, ‪Yael

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.05.036

Cited by 79 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Avinadav et al. () explore the quality investment and pricing strategies in a two‐echelon supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract. They analyze the channel members' equilibrium strategies under different attitudes toward risk.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adida and Ratisoontorn (2011) investigate how retailers' competition affects the decisions and profits of the supply chain under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue sharing. Avinadav et al (2015b) explore the quality investment and pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract. They analyze the channel members' equilibrium strategies under different attitudes toward risk.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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Supply chain contracts are widely considered as useful and necessary tools to guide and restrict channel members' behaviors. Considering the effect of dynamic advertising, we investigate two distinct types of contracts between a dominant retailer and her manufacturer. One contract is a traditional wholesale price contract and the other is a consignment contract. The results show that, compared to the wholesale price contract, the consignment contract is always more desirable from the perspectives of the retailer and the entire channel and brings more consumer surplus. When the dominant retailer's advertising effort is very effective or channel members have enough patience, the dominant retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a Pareto improvement under the consignment contract; otherwise the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…They found that the more risk averse the retailer, the lower its profit and the more it favored multiple promotion policies. Avinadav et al [4] investigated the revenue sharing contract used in the mobile applications (Apps) industry. They focused on how supply chain members' different attitudes toward risk: averse, neutral and seeking behaviors affected equilibrium strategies and chain performance.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Decision policies on players’ different risk combination under supplier encroachment

Chen

Huang

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Literature concerning about the supply chain management problem is usually based on perfect rationality. However, risk preferences have been proved to be an important role which influences managers' decisions significantly. This paper investigates a risk combination problem under supplier encroachment with different risk preferences players. Assuming that the supply chain players may be risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-taking, we build a Stackelberg game model to explore the optimal decisions and the impact of different risk combinations, respectively. We focus on two scenarios: the consumers perceive uniform quality between the two channels and perceive differentiated quality between the two channels. We find that the retailer always prefers a risk-averse supplier, while the supplier always prefers a risk-taking retailer. But the combination of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-taking retailer is not always beneficial to the whole supply chain. Further, we conduct numerical experiments to explore the risk combinations and the impacts of players' selfish, aggressive and altruistic behaviors on optimal decisions. Mathematics Subject Classification. 90B50, 91A30.

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“…Furthermore, whereas most work thus far has assumed that supply chain members are risk-neutral, we study the influence of different risk attitudes on the supply chain performance. In addition, while the papers above study the competition effect only via prices, we extend it to consider investment in the quality of the app as well (Spriestersbach and Springer, 2004;El Ouardighi and Kim, 2010;Xie et al, 2011;Hasan et al, 2012;Avinadav et al, 2014b).…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consignment contract for mobile apps between a single retailer and competitive developers with different risk attitudes

Avinadav

Chernonog

Perlman‬‏

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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The effect of risk sensitivity on a supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and quality investment

Cited by 79 publications

References 44 publications

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Decision policies on players’ different risk combination under supplier encroachment

Consignment contract for mobile apps between a single retailer and competitive developers with different risk attitudes

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