“…Our paper complements the literature examining the motivation and impact on merger outcomes of various contractual provisions in M&A deals, such as termination fee provisions (Bates & Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003), collars (Officer, 2004, 2006), lock‐up options (Burch, 2001), go‐shop provisions (Gogineni & Puthenpurackal, 2017), and material adverse clauses (Denis &Macias, 2013). We also contribute to a nascent literature on shareholder voting in the approval process for M&A deals (Becht et al., 2016; Harford et al., 2011; Hsieh & Wang, 2008; Kamar, 2011; Li et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2017; Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008).…”