Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in
Non-Technical SummarySince the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, the fight against tax evasion and avoidance has gained new momentum and the political pressure on tax havens to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information is increasing. In order to be delisted from the black list of tax havens, countries are required to sign at least twelve tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). This paper examines whether TIEAs affect the operations of German multinational enterprises (MNEs) in tax havens. For the purpose of this study, we focus on a list of small tax havens, some of which have concluded TIEAs with Germany, some have not. The main research question is whether the conclusion of these agreements is associated with a lower activity of German MNEs compared to activities in tax haven countries and offshore centers that have not concluded such an agreement with Germany.Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer. It also suggests that information exchange has measurable effects on FDI.
Does Exchange of Information between Tax AuthoritiesInfluence Multinationals' Use of Tax Havens?Julia Braun † and Alfons Weichenrieder ‡
February 2015
AbstractSince the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.