The effect of the validity of co‐occurrence on automatic and deliberate evaluations

Abstract

Co‐occurrence of an object and affective stimuli does not always mean that the object and the stimuli are the same valence (e.g., false accusations that Richard is a crook). Contemporary theory posits that information about the (in)validity of co‐occurrence has stronger influence on deliberate than automatic evaluation. However, available evidence supports that hypothesis only when the (in)validity information is delayed. Further, the existing evidence is open to alternative methodological accounts. In six high‐powered experiments (total N = 1750), we modified previous procedures to minimize alternative explanations and examine whether delayed (in)validity information has a discrepant effect on automatic versus deliberate evaluation. Casting doubt on the generality of the hypothesis, we found more sensitivity of deliberate than automatic evaluation to delayed validity information only when automatic evaluation was measured with the Implicit Association Test and not with the evaluative priming task or the affective misattribution procedure.

Believability of evidence matters for correcting social impressions

“…Even after people have rehearsed and expressed their initial impression, once they confront new evidence that is believable, they can correct it, even at the implicit level. This extends earlier work that suggested that information can be negated only if we know that it is false at the time we learn it (7) or very soon after if there is extensive rehearsal of the information (8) but that such negations are less impactful if we only later discover that the information is false. This earlier work suggested (7) that once an association has formed through the associative processes that are argued to underlie implicit cognition, it cannot be easily corrected thereafter.…”

“…ref. 8). Thus, in Study 5, we tested how the delayed discovery of the reliability of information influenced implicit impression correction.…”

“…This is important to investigate because impression formation and correction may be governed by distinct processes (18). For example, although implicit impressions can be sensitive to the stated accuracy of information during initial formation (8,19), they seem to be relatively insensitive to truth value after they have formed (18). We also focus on the role of truth value in revision because it is highly consequential: indeed, the goal of many disinformation campaigns is to change people's minds about someone, such as when rumors are spread to inflict damage on otherwise positive reputations.…”

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

“…For example, recent research suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, procedural learning may take place with conscious awareness of implicit skills (Tran and Pashler 2017). Contrary to a widespread assumption of contemporary evaluation theory, automatic evaluations are probably not any less sensitive to validity information than deliberate evaluation are (Moran et al 2017). Researchers have demonstrated that people can accurately predict and consciously report their own implicit attitudes (Hahn et al 2014).…”

The Effect of Group Membership and Individuating Information on Automatic and Deliberate Evaluation of Well-Known People

“…For each actor, participants also responded to three questions in the format of How likable [trustworthy, friendly] is Eddie Murphy? Using response options that ranged from 1 (Extremely unlikeable [untrustworthy; unfriendly]) to 9 (Extremely likeable [trustworthy; friendly]) (adapted from Moran, Bar-Anan,& Nosek, 2017). The order of the six questions (three for each actor) was randomized for each participant.…”