The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

Sprinz, Detlef F.; Sælen, Håkon; Underdal, Arild; Hovi, Jon

doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1410090

Cited by 26 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The sluggish rate of ratification among other countries in this time periodnot even the EU ratified until 2002-is a strong indicator for the perceived importance of the United States for the effectiveness of the climate regime. A more recent study confirms that the lack of U.S. involvement continues to constrain the potential of other actors to address climate change effectively after the Paris Agreement (Sprinz et al 2017).…”

Section: Us Engagement In International Climate Negotiations As a Tmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change—Made in USA?

Milkoreit¹

2019

Perspect. polit.

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The 2015 Paris Agreement established a new logic for international climate governance: the pledge-and-review system. In 2009, the same idea had been proposed in the Copenhagen Accord, but was then forcefully rejected by the negotiation community. Explaining this turnaround, I analyze the role of the United States in the international climate negotiations, using Putnam’s two-level game framework and Snidal’s k-group theory. U.S. domestic politics imposed significant constraints on the terms of the Paris Agreement, contributing to the emergence of the new treaty architecture. Until 2015, U.S. negotiators were either unable or unwilling to bring the demands of political actors at the domestic and international levels in alignment. President Obama achieved this alignment in 2015 by creating international support for a treaty without legally binding obligations that could circumvent a Congressional ratification barrier. The latter required a surprising move: the proactive engagement of China despite the structural context of hegemonic transition.

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Section: Us Engagement In International Climate Negotiations As a Tmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change—Made in USA?

Milkoreit¹

2019

Perspect. polit.

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“…Two such highprofile countries remaining outside such a club is likely to greatly limit its chances of success. Indeed, previous modeling simulations found that climate clubs are far more likely to be successful with US involvement (Hovi et al 2019, Sprinz et al 2018.…”

Section: Challenges At the National Levelmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Interest in minilateral solutions to climate change has increased in recent years and a great deal of discussion regarding the characteristics and potential benefits of climate club arrangements can be found in the literature (Leycegui and Ramírez 2015, Nordhaus 2015, Victor 2015, Falkner 2016, Gampfer 2016, Hovi et al 2016, Keohane et al 2017, Nordhaus 2017, Victor 2017, Sprinz et al 2018, Hagen and Eisenack 2019, Paroussos et al 2019. Nevertheless, discussions on the subject to date have tended to assume that membership would be limited to national actors.…”

Section: Climate Clubs Beyond Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A multi-level climate club with national and sub-national members: theory and application to US states

Martin

Bergh

2019

Environ. Res. Lett.

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The minilateral approach of a climate club of countries has been suggested as an intermediate phase in a transition towards a global agreement that enforces national climate policies through harmonization. To garner critical mass, we propose an extended club configuration including sub-national states or provinces, resulting in a multi-level club. This would allow considerable contributions from important emitters like the US to be brought on board, relevant given its intended withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. We elaborate this idea and clarify potential roles of participants at distinct levels. The concept is operationalized by developing a method for identifying suitable entities at each level that uses a set of likelihood-of-involvement indicators capturing existing carbon dependence, public opinion, government policy and climate coalition membership. Application at the national level identifies a subset of seven of the highest emitting countries representing 21% of global emissions. This rises to 51% assuming that China, the dominant global emitter, could be enticed into the group. Given that US involvement remains unlikely for now, we illustrate selection at the sub-national level for US states. Here, an initial group of 21 states appear as potential members, jointly accounting for 36% of national emissions. An additional group, representing a further 34% of emissions, are potentially receptive to enticement via trade dependencies on four key countries identified within the group of national members. Accordingly, some 70% of US emissions, representing 11% of global totals, may be subject to climate club involvement via a combination of these pathways. While the implementation of such a club requires various political and legal hurdles to be overcome, the ongoing threat of climate change and inadequacies of the Paris Agreement suggest that novel solutions of this kind deserve serious attention from scientists and politicians.

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“…Given the rejection of the Paris Agreement by the US government, the possibility of the USA committing to an ambitious climate policy is currently very unlikely. It is noteworthy, though, that one study finds that coalitions can function even without the participation of the USA, as long as other major emitters show leadership (Sprinz et al, 2018). Participation by the USA in some form, next to the EU and China, would, nevertheless, represent an ideal starting point for a carbon-pricing climate club.…”

Section: Likely Members Of An Initial Coalitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing

et al. 2020

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Unilateral climate policies have been unable to achieve intended emissions reductions. We argue that international harmonization of climate policy beyond the Paris Agreement is the only way forward and that global carbon pricing, either through a tax or market, is the best available instrument to manage this. A foundation has already been laid, as current carbon pricing initiatives cover about 20% of global CO 2 emissions. Since it limits free-riding by countries/jurisdictions, global carbon pricing is, in principle, behaviourally easier to negotiate than other instruments, such as emission targets or technical standards. To overcome political resistance, we propose a dynamic strategy consisting of two parallel tracks and five transition phases. The first track entails assembly of a carbon-pricing coalition that expands over time and exerts moral and economic pressure on non-members to join. The second track involves refocusing UN intergovernmental climate change negotiations on carbon pricing, potentially involving initially heterogeneous prices reflecting distinct income levels of countries, which then gradually converge. The dual tracks are designed to reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. The proposal results in a transition trajectory consisting of two interactive tracks and five phases, with specific attention to inequity within and among countries. We illustrate how such an approach could function with either a carbon tax or market. Key policy insights. International harmonization of climate policies is required to achieve the deep cuts in emissions needed to meet the Paris Agreement's 2°C or 1.5°C target.. A focus on carbon pricingeither through taxation or emissions tradinghas multiple strengths: it can be easily compared and harmonized among countries; it can be gradually strengthened over time; it moderates freeriding and fear of competitiveness losses; and it automatically generates revenues to compensate low-income households and countries.

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The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

Cited by 26 publications

References 23 publications

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change—Made in USA?

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change—Made in USA?

A multi-level climate club with national and sub-national members: theory and application to US states

A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing

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