The Effects of a Self‐sacrificing Minority on Pro‐environmental Norms and Behavior: An Investigation Using a Sea Pollution Game

Abstract

This research investigated how a minority member sacrificing his/her personal benefits to protect the environment might influence the attitudes and behavior of others. The experiment, using a sea pollution game, employed a 2(minority factor)×2(cost factor) factorial design. Under the high‐cost condition, in which an ecological minority bears the substantial cost it was hypothesized that the rate of subjects' pro‐environmental behavior would be higher in the one‐minority case than in the no‐minority case. In contrast, under the low‐cost condition, the differences between these two cases would decrease. The results supported this assumption. In prompting pro‐environmental behavior, a self‐sacrification minority member is more influential than one whose behavior is not self‐sacrificing. Moreover, under the one‐minority condition, path analyses indicated that the subjects' cost evaluation did not affect their behavior. It was concluded that when the subjects saw an ecological minority, the inhibiting effects of cost on their pro‐environmental behavior would decrease.