The Effects of Being Out of the Labor Market on Subsequent Wages: Evidence for Uruguay

Amarante, Verónica; Arim, Rodrigo; Dean, Andrés

doi:10.1007/s12122-013-9171-3

Cited by 17 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…This is what González-Rozada, Ronconi, and Ruffo (2011) found in the case of Argentina when they analyzed the 2006 unemployment insurance reform, which raised the benefit for all workers (permanent and temporary; see Figure 4.4.a) and extended the length of the benefit for workers aged 45 and over. Amarante, Arim, and Dean (2013) obtained similar findings in Uruguay when they examined the reform of 2009, which extended the benefit for workers aged 50 and over (by four weeks; see Figure 4.4.b). In the case of Chile, the 2009 reform increased the real benefit and relaxed the eligibility criteria for benefits from the Solidarity Fund (which acts as unemployment insurance per se).…”

Section: Bosch and Maloneysupporting

confidence: 53%

“…With the reform of 2009, Uruguay shifted from a constant payment schedule of 50% of the pre-dismissal wage for six months to a decreasing schedule starting at 66% and ending at 44%, without changing the full amount of the benefit received over the six-month period. Amarante, Arim, and Dean (2013) found a small but significant reduction (approximately one week) in the length of unemployment that, moreover, did not lower the quality of reemployment, measured in terms of wages.…”

Section: Bosch and Maloneymentioning

confidence: 78%

“…In the short term, workers do not appear to recover their level of income. This is important considering the workers who change sector and are displaced (see Amarante, Arim, and Dean, 2014). In Argentina, for example, one year after dismissal the loss of income associated with the loss of a formal job is around 40% (see Figure 2.14).…”

Section: Box 22 Self-employment and Economic Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it may have a negative impact on the length of unemployment, the probability of remaining unemployed, and the wage upon reemployment. A series of studies financed by the Inter-American Development Bank explored these aspects in Argentina (González-Rozada, Ronconi, and Ruffo, 2011), Chile (Huneeus, Leiva, and Micco, 2012), Colombia (Medina, Núñez, and Tamayo, 2013), and Uruguay (Amarante, Arim, and Dean, 2013). Gerard and Gonzaga (2013) also conducted a similar study for Brazil.…”

Section: Unemployment Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Huneeus, Leiva, and Micco (2012) found no evidence that the increased benefit resulted in a better job, as measured by a higher reemployment wage. 12 Amarante, Arim, and Dean (2013) found that the reemployment wage did not increase with the extension of the benefit for people over 50, that job loss generally has an impact on wages that may be long-term, and that unemployment insurance cannot make up for this (see Box 4.7).…”

Section: Bosch and Maloneymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the licenseThe opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. SECOND EDITIONThis edition includes some changes from the formatting of the fi rst edition. Changes in the calculation of non-wage costs have also been introduced, affecting Figures 2.6-2.10, 4.5, and 5.7. These changes are due to several adjustments that can be summarized as follows: 1. the inclusion of contributions to training institutions in Nicaragua and Paraguay; 2. changes in taxable income for the calculation of premiums (gross income in some cases and income net of the additional year-end bonus in others); 3. adjustments in the upper and lower thresholds for determining taxable income, which affect the calculation of the total contribution rate (as established by law, largely dependent on the minimum wage).Furthermore, specifi c adjustments were made for some countries. In Nicaragua, the advance notice penalty was eliminated, as it is not provided for in labor law, and in Jamaica, an adjustment was made in the working population obtained from the Labour Force Survey (which was employed to calculate the 2012 GDP per worker).In Figure 5.2, the indicator labeled "other special costs in the event of collective dismissals" for Nicaragua (Item 21 in the calculation of the "protection against collective dismissals of regular workers" indicator) was adjusted from 0 to 0.5. Finally, small changes were made in Figure 2.17, as in some countries, the rate refl ected the percentage of employees who received job training out of the total population (15-64 years old) rather than out of employees of the same age group. Jamaica was excluded from this Figure, since the survey only contains data for the inactive population.The Spanish acronym for youths who are neither in education nor working is "NINIs"; the usual English acronym refers to youths "not in education, employment, or training" (or "NEETs"). However, translating NINIs as NEETs would not be accurate, as the household surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) do not capture whether people are enrolled in training institutions. Therefore, this book does not use the standard English acronym NEET. The same applies to youths who are "neith...

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Section: Bosch and Maloneysupporting

confidence: 53%

Section: Bosch and Maloneymentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Box 22 Self-employment and Economic Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Unemployment Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Bosch and Maloneymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Alaimo¹,

Bosch²,

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Welfare effects of unemployment benefits when informality is high

Liepmann,

Pignatti

2024

Journal of Public Economics

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Worker takeovers: a comparative analysis of employee buyouts, other worker-managed firms, and conventional firms in Uruguay

Dean

2024

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The economic crisis experienced by many developed countries over the past decade saw the emergence of the phenomenon of so-called recovered firms (RFs), or employee buyouts of failed capitalist firms (CFs). While it is obvious that one of the objectives sought by these workers is to keep their jobs, the subsequent performance of these firms is unclear. Are RFs more likely to fail than other worker managed firms (WMFs) or than CFs? Do RF workers get higher incomes than their peers in other WMFs or in CFs? This analysis is based on a linked employer–employee panel data set from Uruguayan social security administrative records. The main findings are that RFs survive longer than other WMFs or than CFs. However, RF workers receive incomes lower than those of their peers at other WMFs or at CFs. This income differential is explained partly by a brain drain process and specific human capital losses.

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The Effects of Being Out of the Labor Market on Subsequent Wages: Evidence for Uruguay

Cited by 17 publications

References 16 publications

Empleos para crecer

Empleos para crecer

Welfare effects of unemployment benefits when informality is high

Worker takeovers: a comparative analysis of employee buyouts, other worker-managed firms, and conventional firms in Uruguay

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