The Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Social Engagement and Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Peru's Juntos Programme

Abstract

Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available at http://dnb. AbstractConditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have rapidly expanded throughout the developing world. These programmes have been relatively effective at improving living standards and producing behavioural changes expected to improve human capital among beneficiary children. Little is known, however, about the effect of CCTs on outcomes other than those they intend to modify but which may nonetheless be important for achieving these programmes' longer-term objectives and improving development prospects more generally. This paper addresses this gap by evaluating the effects of CCTs on membership in social organisations and trust in institutions, using evidence from Peru's Juntos programme. The analysis employs household-and district-level data and a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the programme effects, focusing on the 133 districts in which the programme was implemented during 2006. Its effects among both eligible and non-eligible households are estimated. The programme does not have effects on membership in social organisations on either group of households. It increases trust in institutions related to programme conditions among the eligible population, but it decreases trust in the ombudsman's office, a public institution that has channelled grievances arising from exclusion from the programme. While the results regarding eligible households are encouraging news for proponents, those pertaining to non-eligible households reveal a negative unintended consequence that should be a source of concern.

Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government

“…On the one hand, they deliver monetary and other benefits that should improve livelihoods, and they signal to citizens the value their government places on their welfare (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014). Social protection programs may also help individuals build stronger social relationships and make them cooperate more (Adato, 2000;Camacho, 2014;Attanasio et al, 2009Attanasio et al, , 2015. And Camacho (2014) shows that they may increase individuals' exposure to and trust in certain public sector institutions.…”

“…Social protection programs may also help individuals build stronger social relationships and make them cooperate more (Adato, 2000;Camacho, 2014;Attanasio et al, 2009Attanasio et al, , 2015. And Camacho (2014) shows that they may increase individuals' exposure to and trust in certain public sector institutions. 1 All of these factors may raise trust in government.…”

“…Further, such programs often impose paternalistic conditions which could sour state-society relations (Freeland, 2007). Participation in them may further carry a social stigma (Mettler and Stonecash, 2008;Chong et al, 2009;Camacho, 2014;Oduro, 2015) or otherwise cause social tensions between beneficia-ries and non-beneficiaries (Adato, 2000;Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004;Cruces and Rovner, 2008;MacAuslan and Riemenschneider, 2011;Ellis, 2012), thus reducing civic engagement and lowering trust in government. Citizens may also fear that the process for allocating social protection is politicized and unfair; this could affect perceptions of government (Bruhn, 1996;Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002;Guo, 2009;Costa, 2011;Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;Aytaç, 2014).…”

Does relative deprivation condition the effects of social protection programs on political attitudes? Experimental evidence from Pakistan

“…And Corrêa and Cheibub (2016), reviewing several cash transfer programs in Latin America, actually find net anti -incumbent effects, driven by increases in support for the opposition among non-beneficiaries that outweigh increased support for the incumbent among beneficiaries. Camacho (2014) similarly identifies mixed impacts of cash transfers in Peru on trust in institutions-including reduced trust among non-beneficiaries-and finds no impacts on membership in social organizations.…”

Economic Transfers and Social Cohesion in a Refugee-Hosting Setting

“…For example, Familias en Accion, Colombia's flagship conditional cash transfer (CCT) was found to increase social capital, proxied by the willingness to cooperate among community members during a public good game (Attanasio, Polania-Reyes, and Pellerano, 2015). The Peruvian CCT Juntos was also found to have a positive impact on confidence in institutions, but not on membership in social organizations (Camacho, 2014). In Tanzania, a community-managed CCT was found to increase trust that beneficiaries have in local leaders, particularly in those who are elected by citizens to run the programme (Evans, Holtemeyer, and Kosec, 2018).…”