The Effects of Corruptionon Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure

Mauro, Paolo

doi:10.5089/9781451852097.001

Cited by 224 publications

(217 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The point of departure of this line of work is Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who argue that corrupt governments will tend to favor infrastructure and defense projects where corruption opportunities are abundant (compared to spending on say, education and health). The empirical evidence is largely supportive of this since corrupt countries tend to overinvest in public infraestructures which moreover are of lower quality (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), spend more on defense (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2001) and less on education (Mauro 1997 and1998). More recently, Liu and Mikesell (2014) draw on evidence across U.S. states and report that corruption increases spending in public construction projects and reduces spending on education and health.…”

Section: Construction and Corruption: Existing Evidencementioning

confidence: 94%

“…Among its mainy ills, economists have reported that corruption tends to reduce economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995;Mauro 1997;Tanzi and Davoodi 2001), increase income and educational inequalities (Gupta et al 2002), reduce spending on health and education (Mauro 1998;Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2001) and enlarge the underground economy thus reducing government revenues (Johnson et al 1998). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

2015

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The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both casestudy and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. JEL Classification: D73, L74

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Section: Construction and Corruption: Existing Evidencementioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

2015

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“…Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2005) find that black market premium is higher in countries that are plagued by more corruption. De la Croix and Delavallade (2009), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), and Mauro (1997) argue that corruption distorts public expenditures in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. Murphy et al (1991Murphy et al ( , 1993 argue that it drives potential entrepreneurs to rent-seeking activities, or even to becoming corrupt officials themselves.…”

Section: Review Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

Akarca

Tansel

2016

Journal of Economic Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. licence. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 9162 June 2015 ABSTRACT Voter Reaction to Government Incompetence and Corruption Related to the 1999 Earthquakes in Turkey *Two major earthquakes which struck northwestern Turkey in 1999 exposed rampant corruption involving construction and zoning code violations. The government's relief efforts were tainted by corruption as well, and exhibited a great deal of incompetence. How voters responded to these in the next election held in 2002 is investigated. The fact that different group of parties were responsible for the construction of the shoddy buildings, and for the corruption and mismanagement related to relief, provided us with a unique opportunity to determine whether and how the electorate punished the culprits for each of these. Vote equations are estimated for the seven major political parties. These are fitted to crossprovincial data individually, using OLS, Robust Regression methods, and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions procedures. The same picture emerg...

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“…The few 1 See Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) for more details on these indexes. Other examples that use these indexes include Mauro (1995Mauro ( , 1997, Gupta, et al (2001), and Paldam (2002). See also the studies published in the four-volume set on The Politics of Corruption, edited by and , which also include several empirical studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price adjustment under the table: Evidence on efficiency-enhancing corruption

Lévy

2007

European Journal of Political Economy

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Based on first-hand account, this paper offers evidence on price setting and price adjustment mechanisms that were illegally employed under the Soviet planning and rationing regime. The evidence is anecdotal, and is based on personal experience during the years 1960-1971 in the Republic of Georgia. The description of the social organization of the black markets and other illegal economic activities that I offer depicts the creative and sophisticated ways that were used to confront the shortages created by the inefficient centrally-planned command economic price system with its distorted relative prices. The evidence offers a glimpse of quite explicit micro-level evidence on various types of behavior and corruption that were common in Georgia. Rent-seeking behavior, however, led to emergence of remarkably well-functioning and efficiency enhancing black markets. The evidence, thus, underscores once again the role of incentives in a rent-seeking society.JEL Classification: B14; D30; D73; E64; H26; H40; K42; O17; P20; P26; Z13

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The Effects of Corruptionon Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure

Cited by 224 publications

References 15 publications

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey

Price adjustment under the table: Evidence on efficiency-enhancing corruption

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