The effects of focus of attention on attributional bias in patients experiencing auditory hallucinations

The Phenomenological Diversity of Hallucinations: Some theoretical and clinical implications

“…In particular, Bentall argues that hallucinating subjects might have a specific bias towards attributing their thoughts to an external source (i.e., a difficulty in reality monitoring), or a so-called "externalising bias". A number of studies have provided evidence for an externalising bias in both clinical and non-clinical subjects (e.g., Baker & Morrison, 1998;Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991;Bentall & Slade, 1985a;Brébion et al, 2000;Ensum & Morrison, 2003;Johns & McGuire, 1999;Larøi, Van der Linden, & Marczewski, 2004a;Morrison & Haddock, 1997;Rankin & O'Carroll, 1995;Seal, Crowe, & Cheung, 1997). Furthermore, this stance is in accordance with the general supposition made by several cognitive theorists that hallucinations are inner events misattributed to an external source (e.g., Beck & Rector, 2003;Frith, 1992;Hoffman, 1986;Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995).…”

“…For instance, in the series of studies carried out by Morrison and collaborators (all using the same type of task; i.e., Baker & Morrison, 1998;Ensum & Morrison, 2003;Morrison & Haddock, 1997), the authors conclude that their findings support the hypothesis that patients experiencing hallucinations have a bias towards misattributing self-generated words to an external source. It is important to note, however, that when they refer to evidence of a misattribution of self-generated items to an external source, this is essentially their interpretation of the findings.…”

“…In addition, psychological processes have not been adequately examined, as studies typically involve experimental tasks that only include one internal source and one external source (e.g., Baker & Morrison, 1998;Bentall et al, 1991;Bentall & Slade, 1985a;Brébion et al, 2000;Ensum & Morrison, 2003;Johns & McGuire, 1999;Larøi et al, 2004a;Morrison & Haddock, 1997;Rankin & O'Carroll, 1995;Seal et al, 1997). The exclusive use of these types of source monitoring tasks posses certain methodological limits, which in turn have theoretical consequences.…”

Esse est percipi: A Neurophilosophical Model of Psychosis

“…The other subtypes are replays of memories of previous conversations the patients had experienced, voices being spoken in the first person (and possibly being one's own voice/thoughts) and, finally, nonverbal auditory hallucinations. Importantly, all of these AVH subtypes, as well as hallucinations of other modalities (visual, tactile), have a common phenomenological characteristic: they are primordially self-relevant and self-focused (the experience either comes from the person or is directed to the person or generally concerns the person) [11,12,13,14,15]. Thus, although different neurocognitive processes have been proposed for the different AVH clusters - and, in addition, different neurobiological underpinnings may account for hallucinations of different sensory modalities - there seems to be a common neurobiological mechanism which accounts for the increased self-relatedness of the hallucinatory experience.…”

“…The view that hallucinations may be related to a switch between the frames of reference in perceptual intentionality is supported by first-person accounts, which report a high frequency of self-relatedness and self-focused attention in hallucinatory experiences [11,12,13,14]. Self-focused attention is defined as ‘an awareness of self-referent, internally generated information that stands in contrast to an awareness of externally generated information derived through sensory receptors' [[41], p. 156].…”