The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial

Abstract

The Israeli matriculation certificate is a prerequisite for most postsecondary schooling. In a randomized trial, we attempted to increase certification rates among low-achievers with cash incentives. The experiment used a school-based randomization design offering awards to all who passed their exams in treated schools. This led to a substantial increase in certification rates for girls but had no effect on boys. Affected girls had a relatively high ex ante chance of certification. The increase in girls' matriculation rates translated into an increased likelihood of college attendance. Female matriculation rates increased partly because treated girls devoted extra time to exam preparation. (JEL I21, I28, J16)

Giving kids a head start: The impact and mechanisms of early commitment of financial aid on poor students in rural China

“…High school tuition fees in some developing countries are high, relative to the average income of households from poor, rural areas (Liu et al, 2009). High tuition fees are further accompanied by high (and often rising) opportunity costs of staying in school (Angrist and Lavy, 2009). Opportunity costs are especially a problem for students entering high school, since labor laws in many developing countries permit high school-age students to find employment.…”

“…Students in junior high forecast their chances of attending high school (Angrist and Lavy, 2009;Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999;Oreopoulos, 2007). Because of the high costs of attending high school, poor students who are unable to pay for high school may forecast that their chances to attend are zero, no matter how much effort they exert.…”

Learning for a bonus: How financial incentives interact with preferences

“…Conversely, for patient students, perceived marginal benefits change only slightly (if at all), as the size of the short-term incentive is smaller than the size of discounted long-term labor market benefits. Therefore, short-term incentives should particularly encourage the group of impatient students to increase their school performance (as already speculated by authors of related studies, such as Angrist and Lavy, 2009;Castillo et al, 2011;Fryer, 2011). We thus derive our second hypothesis: When students receive short-term rewards, relatively impatient students increase their school performance more than relatively patient students.…”

“…Our control variables are similar to those used in comparable studies on student achievement (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 2009;Bettinger, 2010). Finally, we include u i , an individual specific standard error.…”

“…Quasi-experimental and experimental studies evaluate financial incentive programs designed to improve student performance. These studies typically find small average program effects, if any at all (for secondary and post-secondary education, see, among others, Angrist and Lavy, 2009;Fryer, 2011;Leuven et al, 2010). Nonetheless, their findings suggest that while such programs can have positive effects for certain groups of students, they can have no or even negative effects for other groups of students.…”