The effects of motor skill on object permanence

Bower, T. G. R.; Wishart, Jennifer G.

doi:10.1016/0010-0277(72)90017-0

Cited by 84 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…These findings are not unique to this particular means-end task. Infants retrieve objects more often from transparent barriers than from opaque barriers regardless of whether they remove a cover, pull a towel, push a button, reach through a curtain, or reach into liquids (Bower & Wishart, 1972;Munakata et al, 1997;Shinskey, 2000). Furthermore, the experiment controlled for factors that previous research with transparent barriers has not.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the prevailing means-end deficit account, infants know the object continues to exist but cannot coordinate the actions to uncover it in a means-end sequence (e.g., Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990;Bower & Wishart, 1972;Diamond, 1991). The hidden object is the end, and removing the occluder is the means.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…If infants demonstrate means-end skill with a transparent barrier, then failure with an opaque barrier cannot be due solely to a means-end deficit. Infants who watch as objects are placed behind transparent and opaque barriers retrieve them more often in the transparent condition (e.g., Bower & Wishart, 1972;Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997;Shinskey, Bogartz, & Poirier, 2000). Another approach equates means-end demands by taking them away from both visible and hidden events.…”

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Detecting Transparent Barriers: Clear Evidence Against the Means‐End Deficit Account of Search Failures

Shinskey¹,

Munakata²

2001

Infancy

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The standard explanation of infants' search failures with hidden objects, despite an apparent sensitivity to them, is a deficit in the means-end skill for retrieving objects from occluders. Studies equating means-end demands for retrieving toys from transparent and opaque barriers challenge this account by showing that infants succeed more with visible objects. However, they suffer from a critical limitation: Infants may retrieve visible objects without noticing the transparent barriers in front of them. We addressed this concern by requiring infants to notice a barrier to retrieve a toy and specifically to pull down a rotating screen to retrieve a toy from behind it. Seven-month-olds used this means-end skill more often with a transparent barrier than an opaque one. Thus, neither a means-end deficit nor an ability to ignore transparent barriers fully accounts for search failures. Relations to other findings challenging the means-end deficit account and implications for approaches to studying cognitive development are discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Detecting Transparent Barriers: Clear Evidence Against the Means‐End Deficit Account of Search Failures

Shinskey¹,

Munakata²

2001

Infancy

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“…Reaching can be more closely equated to facial imitation in the special cases in which the hand is obscured from the infant's view during reaching (Bower, 1982;Butterworth & Hopkins, 1988;Clifton, Muir, Ashmead, & Clarkson, 1993;Lasky, 1977;Rochat, Blass, & Hoffmeyer, 1988). There are particularly interesting parallels between memory-based facial imitation and reaching in the dark to a remembered object (Bower & Wishart, 1972;Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991). In such studies, hand position cannot be monitored by vision (as in the case of facial movements), and infants must move an unseen body part to a remembered and currently invisible target (which makes it more parallel to the deferred imitation case).…”

Section: Motor Organization and Imitation Of Noveltymentioning

confidence: 99%

Imitation, memory, and the representation of persons

Meltzoff¹,

Moore²

2002

Infant Behavior and Development

135

152

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Imitation was tested both immediately and after a 24-hr retention interval in 6-week-old infants. The results showed immediate imitation, which replicates past research, and also imitation from memory, which is new. The latter finding implicates recall memory and establishes that 6-weekolds can generate actions on the basis of stored representations. The motor organization involved in imitation was investigated through a microanalysis of the matching response. Results revealed that infants gradually modified their behavior towards more accurate matches over successive trials. It is proposed that early imitation serves a social identity function. Infants are motivated to imitate after a 24-hr delay as a means of clarifying whether the person they see before them is the same one they previously encountered. They use the reenactment of a person's behavior to probe whether this is the same person. In the domain of inanimate objects, infants use physical manipulations (e.g., shaking) to perform this function. Imitation is to understanding people as physical manipulation is to understanding things. Motor imitation, the behavioral reenactment of things people do, is a primitive means of understanding and communicating with people. Keywordsimitation; memory; mental representation; faces; cross-modal; motor coordination; self; identity; communication; theory of mind; development Children learn by watching adults. Young children often do as parents do instead of as parents say, suggesting that visual models exert a powerful influence on children's actions. In infancy, before language, imitation plays an especially prominent role: It is an avenue for teaching motor skills and also embodies a mutuality and reciprocity that is the essence of communication at the nonverbal level. As apparently simple and commonplace as imitation is, it presents some of the deepest puzzles for theories of infancy. In order to imitate, the child must see the adult's actions, use this visual perception as a basis for an action plan, and execute the motor output. Thus, imitation taps perception, cross-modal coordination, and motor control. If imitation takes place after a significant delay, memory is also involved. The type of memory indexed by imitation is not merely recognition memory, because the infant is doing more than seeing a pattern as familiar or novel. The infant must generate an action on the basis of a memory, thus illustrating a primitive form of nonverbal recall memory (Mandler, 1990;Meltzoff, 1985Meltzoff, , 1988aMeltzoff, , 1990b.Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Andrew N. Meltzoff, Department of Psychology (WJ-10), University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195. NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author ManuscriptThe rich psychological web in which imitation is situated-learning, communication, perception-action links, memory, and representation-has made it an enduring topic in developmental psychology (Baldwin, 1906;Piaget, 1962) and an issue in philosophy of...

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“…Conditions of pure ballistic reaching were approximated III an experiment by Bower and Wishart (1972) in which infants of 20 weeks, or so, were shown a toy and then reached as the lights were extinguished. They demonstrated accurate reaching, which indicates that nonguided ballistic-type reaching was certainly possible for this age group.…”

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confidence: 99%