The effects of R&amp;D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

Biancardi, Marta; Villani, Giovanni

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.026

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…And due to heterogeneity, countries may disagree on the coalition they find optimal, such that no equilibrium may exist. More recently, Biancardi and Villani (2015) extend the dynamic model of Biancardi and Villani (2014) (discussed in Section 2) to include R&D linkages and they find that this leads to increased cooperation compared to the pure IEA game.…”

Section: Iea Games With Randdmentioning

confidence: 94%

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

Marrouch

Chaudhuri

2016

IRERE

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We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages, which focus on a single externality stemming from global pollution; IEA games with side payments and issue linkages, which consider carrot or stick mechanisms to lure cooperators or punish defectors; political economy models, which examine intra-and intergovernmental issues that affect international negotiations; design issues of IEAs; behavioral factors, which affect the willingness of countries to cooperate; and additional externalities resulting from open economy issues and adaptation, which interact with the global pollution externality and affect the free-riding incentives of countries. Based on this classification of the literature, we attempt to identify conditions under which an * We would like to thank Rita Antar for her excellent research assistance. We appreciate insightful comments by two anonymous reviewers and the editors.

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Section: Iea Games With Randdmentioning

confidence: 94%

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

Marrouch

Chaudhuri

2016

IRERE

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“…Under the right circumstances, penalties, trade restrictions, minimum participation rules, and permit trading schemes also can boost participation (Rubio and Casino 2005;Carraro, Marchiori, and Oreffice 2009;Karp and Zhao 2010;Harstad 2015). Moreover, in repeated games-which allow countries to join the agreement in different moments-the results are more optimistic than in one-off games (Bloch and Gomes 2006;Biancardi and Villani 2015;Wagner 2016).…”

Section: [A]introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Participation Dilemma: A Survey of the Empirical Literature on International Environmental Agreement Ratification

Bellelli

Aftab

Scarpa

2023

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

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Several of the most pressing environmental problems involve transboundary issues and can only be solved through international cooperation. Hence, a successful policy response requires a good understanding of international environmental agreements-the primary tool for international cooperation. What motivates participation in environmental agreements, and how can it be increased? These questions have been addressed in economic research, mostly using game-theoretical approaches, in models that predict the optimal emission abatement and participation levels. Our survey focuses on a contiguous body of work: the empirical literature on environmental treaty participation. The scope of this paper is to compile the first detailed survey of the empirical literature on participation in environmental agreements, summarize its findings, and enable better comparison with theoretical predictions.

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An Evolutionary Game Approach in International Environmental Agreements with R&D Investments

Villani

Biancardi

2018

Comput Econ

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The effects of R&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

Cited by 6 publications

References 25 publications

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

The Participation Dilemma: A Survey of the Empirical Literature on International Environmental Agreement Ratification

An Evolutionary Game Approach in International Environmental Agreements with R&D Investments

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