The Effects of Shock Size and Type on Labor‐Contract Duration

Wallace, Frederick

doi:10.1086/322077

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This observation has motivated both theoretical and empirical interest on contract duration. Most of the past empirical research on contract duration has focused on labor contracts (Christofides and Wilton 1983;Christofides 1985;Kanago 1988;Vroman 1989;Murphy 1992;Wallace and Blanco 1991;Rich and Tracy 1999;and Wallace 2001). 7 Our study is the first to provide evidence on the duration of retail distribution contracts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising

Brickley

Misra

Horn

2006

The Journal of Law and Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Economists generally view standard franchise contracts as efficient, while franchisee advocates view them as exploitive. Consistent with the economic view, we find that contract duration is positively and significantly related to the franchisee's physical and human capital investments (which are often firm specific). In contrast to assertions by franchisee advocates, we find that these relations exist in subsamples containing only the most established franchisors (as measured by size and experience) and that larger, more experienced franchisors tend to offer longer-term contracts than do newer franchisors. Our evidence also suggests that there is learning across firms about optimal contract terms.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising

Brickley

Misra

Horn

2006

The Journal of Law and Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A similar result has been obtained by Gray (1978) in a macroeconomic setting that assumes complete synchronization of all contracts, and by Dye (1985), Harris and Holmstrom (1987), and Danziger (1988) in a partial equilibrium setting. Empirical support can be found in Ehrenberg et al (1984), Christofides (1990), Murphy (1992), Wallace (2001), Rich and Tracy (2004), and Christofides and Peng (2006).…”

Section: Analytical Approximationsmentioning

confidence: 78%

Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts

Danziger¹

2010

Labour Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Uniform and Nonuniform Staggering of Wage ContractsThis paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic substitutes, which provides a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary uncertainty. JEL Classification:E31, E32, J41

show abstract

“…Much of the empirical research uses union-firm contract data to test these competing hypotheses, but the results were mixed. For example, see Wallace (2001). 3.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Length, Expected Surplus, and Specific Investments

Tang

2013

Journal of Sports Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study empirically tests how expected surplus and specific investments affect the structure of National Football League player contracts. Empirical results show that both length and monetary compensations of a player's contract increase with expected surplus and specific investments. In particular, early draftees with higher expected value of future performance signed longer and more lucrative contracts than later draftees did. This correlation is affected by a team's expected surplus from contracting with their draftees. Comparing to the other teams, teams with more empty seats and fewer wins in the previous season invested more in early draftees, but less in later draftees. The results also indicate that players requiring more specific investments negotiated longer and more lucrative contracts than did other players, particularly quarterbacks.

show abstract

The Effects of Shock Size and Type on Labor‐Contract Duration

Cited by 18 publications

References 21 publications

Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising

Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising

Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts

Contract Length, Expected Surplus, and Specific Investments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About