The efficient allocation of local public factors in Tiebout's tradition

Richter, Wolfram F.

doi:10.1016/0166-0462(94)90001-9

Cited by 47 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Die neuere Forschung zu den Auswirkungen des fiskalischen Föderalismus beschäftigt sich bisher vornehmlich mit den Allokations-und Verteilungswirkungen eines dezentralen Staatsaufbaus (Richter 1994, Wellisch 2000. Im Mittelpunkt der Allokationsbetrachtung steht dabei, inwiefern die dezentrale Bereitstellung und Finanzierung staatlicher Leistungen zu räumlichen und fiskalischen externen Effekten führt, die sich auf Niveau und Qualität öffentlicher Leistungen in anderen Gebietskörperschaften auswirken (Feld 2000, Feld und Lars P. Feld, Horst Zimmermann und Thomas Döring Kirchgässner 2001, Feld und Schneider 2002.…”

Section: Die Problemstellung Oder: Von Der Dominanz Der Effizienzaspeunclassified

Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum

Feld¹,

Zimmermann²,

Döring³

2003

VJH

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Summary:The assignment of competencies in a federal state can have a strong impact on economic growth, because the regions of a country particularly contribute to its total economic development. Hence, public policy should be tailored to regional needs. Public economists however mainly focus on the efficiency of decentralized public goods provision and financing; seldom arguments concerning political innovation due to a decentralized experimentation of policies and its impact on economic growth are considered. After a discussion of theoretical arguments on federalism and economic growth, the empirical question is addressed in this paper whether the assignment of autonomy and the institutional design of fiscal federalism influence economic development of a country. On this basis, open question and potential routes of research are formulated.

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Section: Die Problemstellung Oder: Von Der Dominanz Der Effizienzaspeunclassified

Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum

Feld¹,

Zimmermann²,

Döring³

2003

VJH

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“…It has been argued that the Tiebout sorting mechanism might be less relevant to understand federalist structures in developing countries because local governments rarely have the capacity or incentives to respond to consumer needs (Oates 1993). Successive research, therefore, argued that the Tiebout model is better suited for the sphere of production, i.e., the provision of local factors rather than public goods (Richter 1994). Yet in the context of developing or emerging economies investor preferences might not be diverse enough to allow local governments to target specific demands.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China

Brehm

2017

Asia-Pac J Reg Sci

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Do Chinese cities compete for investments with lax environmental law enforcement? The here presented study suggests that this is true for some municipalities but not all of them. Based on data for 126 key environmental protection cities and regional economic hubs between 2010 and 2012 we show that economic decentralization and political centralization both shape spatial patterns of compliance with environmental transparency legislation. Our results give reason to suppose that the Chinese economy moved beyond homogenous preferences for low-cost regulatory arrangements. The emerging jurisdictional interaction is in line with a Tiebout sorting process, where cities compete with diverse factor packages to attract an optimal amount of investments.

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“…Alternative assumptions are of course possible, and various options are discussed by Feehan and Matsumoto (2000), Richter (1994), Sinn (2003), and Matsumoto (1998Matsumoto ( , 2000a. In 9 addition, as emphasized by Matsumoto (2000a), these two questions are critical to determining the optimal number of firms in a jurisdiction.…”

Section: A Key Assumptions In the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow most of the literature in assuming constant returns to scale and thus constant marginal costs Schwab, 1988, 1991;Sinn, 2003;Bayindir-Upmann, 1998;Keen and Marchand, 1997;Richter, 1994;Matsumoto 2000a). Two alternative approaches, which Matsomoto (2000a) points out are equivalent, are to assume either an imperfectly congestible public input and a constant marginal cost of producing that public input, or a perfectly congestible public input (i.e., our publicly provided private service) and decreasing marginal costs of producing the public service.…”

Section: A Key Assumptions In the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%