The Electoral Benefits of Opportunistic Election Timing

Abstract

In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of the effect of opportunistic elections on the incumbent's electoral performance. The existing literature on parliamentary dissolution and election timing generates contradictory expectations about the ability of incumbent governments to benefit from strategically timed elections. We evaluate these competing hypotheses, drawing on an original dataset of 321 parliamentary elections in 27 East and West European countries, observed from 1945 or democratization to the present. In order to causally identify the effect of opportunistic election calling on incumbent's electoral performance, we rely on instrumental variable regression. Our results reveal that opportunistic election calling generates a significant vote share bonus for the incumbent of as much as 5.5 percentage points. This finding suggests that by timing elections strategically, governments can significantly affect how voters vote. It therefore has powerful implications for our understanding the effectiveness of elections as instruments of democracy and accountability.

Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline

“…In reality, elections are not fixed in the overwhelming majority of parliamentary democracies and only a very small minority of elections could be described as strategically timed or “opportunistic” (Schleiter and Tavits 2016). Indeed, an accounting of over 608 European governments by Seki and Williams (2014) reveals that at least 62% of cabinets terminate in conditions that are not constitutionally mandated elections and are extraordinarily unlikely to be the product of strategic electoral timing—the resignation of the prime minister (for health reasons or otherwise), internal dissent, or loss of parliamentary support.…”

Being Heard above the Noise: The Role of Incumbent Issue Diversity in Election Campaigns

“…2007;Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009;Somer-Topcu 2009;Ezrow 2010;Adams et al 2011;Schleiter and Tavits 2014).The analysis requires a measure of issue scope in election campaigns. Like recent work on the effect of the economy and intra-party politics on election campaigns and studies of policy agendas(Johnand Jennings 2010; Jennings et al 2011; Stoll 2011; Boydstun et al 2014; Greene and O'Brien 2016; Greene 2016a; Van Heck 2016), I measure the concentration and number of issues in parties' platforms using a function of issue diversity, an increasingly important topic in numerous areas of political research.…”

The electoral cycle in political contributions: the incumbency advantage of early elections

“…The evidence suggests that being able to choose times of real or perceived government popularity and favorable economic cycles are not the only advantages incumbent government parties gain from the ability to call early elections. Whether this funding advantage might contribute to the apparent incumbent vote gains from early elections (Schleiter and Tavits, 2016) is a more open question.…”

“…27 The mechanism for an incumbency advantage in private contributions might also change if the motivation of the donor is to buy access to policymakers. If early elections signal a higher chance of winning for the incumbent, see Schleiter and Tavits (2016), this might make access-oriented donors more likely to donate to the incumbent. I owe this alternative mechanisms to a previous commenter.…”

“…Smith (2003) in a study of British elections argues that because early elections serve as a signal for future expected economic declines, incumbent governments might on some occasions be electorally punished for early elections depending on the level of predictability of the early election. In contrast, Schleiter and Tavits (2016) in a comparative study of 27 European countries find a significant incumbent vote gain for early elections.…”