The Electoral College and voter participation rates: An exploratory note

Cebula, Richard J.; Murphy, Dennis R.

doi:10.1007/bf00140841

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…This is a two-stage system whereby individual votes in the first stage determine how the State will cast its vote in the second stage. Cebula and Murphy (1980) have suggested that in a state with one dominant political party a voter cannot affect the outcome of the election, since he cannot reverse the state outcome and thereby alter the disposition of the state's electoral votes. By contrast, under direct elections, the voter enjoys at least a small probability of influencing the outcome and therefore turn-out will tend to be higher.…”

Section: Implied Relationship Of Expected B P and D And Turn-outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of Voting: Theories and Evidence

Struthers¹,

Young²

1989

Journal of Economic Studies

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In seeking to extend rational choice theory from “market” to “political” behaviour, economists have encountered a paradox: namely, that the act of voting itself appears to be inconsistent with the assumption of rationality. This is true not only when self‐interest is assumed, but also when altruistic behaviour (at least in its non‐Kantian form) is allowed for. This article surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of the decision to participate in voting, and concludes that this decision is responsive to changes in the expected benefits and costs of voting; even though the expected costs of voting must normally outweigh the expected benefits. Interpretations of this behaviour include the possibility that voters act rationally, but are misinformed about the likely effectiveness of their votes; alternatively, the electorate may include more Kantians than economists have generally been willing to admit.

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Section: Implied Relationship Of Expected B P and D And Turn-outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of Voting: Theories and Evidence

Struthers¹,

Young²

1989

Journal of Economic Studies

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“…This lends support for the theoretical case argued by Blair (1982, p. 94) that "...abolition of the Electoral College would raise aggregate voter turnout rates." Logically, as argued on theoretical grounds in Cebula and Murphy (1980), it can be further argued that whereas the Electoral College System acts to discourage/decrease voter turnout in states where DP>RP or RP>DP, it also acts to encourage/increase voter participation in states where RP and DP are effectively equal or at least differ from one another only very modestly. This is an issue overlooked in the Cebula (2001) study.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Electoral College System, Political Party Dominance, and Voter Turnout, With Evidence from the 2004 Presidential Election

Cebula

Meads

2007

Atl Econ J

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“…Lizzeri and Persico (2001) claim that the electoral college system is subject to inefficient provision of public goods. Earlier papers e.g., by Blair (1979) or Cebula and Murphy (1980) criticize the electoral college system as giving too little voting power to US minorities and discouraging voter participation. In a more recent piece of work, Cebula (2001) finds empirical evidence that the electoral college system discourages voter participation in states that have a history of leaning towards one party.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%