The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe

Abstract

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long-term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non-mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further.

Citizens and the Crisis: The Great Recession as Constraint and Opportunity

“…Following the economic voting literature, citizens tend to punish incumbents in times of economic downturn for what they see as their poor economic performances (see LewisBeck and Stegmeier 2000 for a review). Recent studies suggest that such an effect of economic voting may be stronger in times of crisis, that is, when the economy goes bad (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). Critics of economic voting theory, however, have questioned such a centrality of the economy in determining the vote choice, suggesting that not all follow economic considerations and showing that the salience of the economy varies across individuals and contexts (Singer 2011).…”

When and where did the great recession erode the support of democracy?

“…These different ways of expressing support imply that the impact of the economic crisis on the legitimacy of advanced democracies in Europe may vary. It may be at danger in particular regions or countries, but it may also remain largely unaffected by the crisis in other countries (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). It is not only the impact of the crisis itself that matters, but also the behaviour of international actors (such as international financial institutions and the EU) and of national actors (such as parties and interest groups) and the institutional infrastructure (such as the type of welfare regime) that affect the capacity of governments to cope with the economic crisis.…”

L’Europe des populismes : confluences et diversité

“…De manière plus importante encore, on remarquera l'absence d'effet significatif de la variable de protectionnisme économique, qui imprègne indifféremment les électorats de la droite de gouvernement et de la gauche populiste. Ce résultat réfute notre hypothèse (H8) et l'argument avancé par Hernandez et Kriesi (2014) d'une structure d'opportunité favorable à l'élaboration d'un programme de protectionnisme socio-économique par les gauches populistes dans les pays les plus sévèrement touchés par la crise.…”