The Electoral Impact of Local Campaigning in the 2014 Regional and Federal Elections

‘It’s a Long Way from Kuusamo to Kuhmo’: Mapping Candidates’ Electoral Constituencies in the Finnish Open-List Single Preference Voting System

“…As to the focus on the Oulu district, three constituency characteristics form the basis for the case selection -territorial magnitude, party magnitude and district magnitude. Territorial magnitude (T) is a readily neglected dimension in work on personal vote seeking and patterns of intraparty competition since T may influence ( 1) the organisational configuration of the party within the constituency; (2) the 'reach' of candidate campaigns (André and Depauw, 2019) and the extent of the candidate-voter distance effect (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012;Gimpel et al, 2008); ( 3) the representational focus of candidates -who they claim or perceive themselves to represent (Chiru, 2018;Heithusen et al, 2005;Valen et al, 2000); ( 4) their scope for credit-claiming (André and Depauw, 2018;Lancaster, 1986); ( 5) the identity of voters and their candidate preferences (Gimpel et al, 2008;Herron and Lynch, 2019;Johnston et al, 2016;Key, 1949). Especially in large-T electoral districts, there are likely to be particularistic loyalties which will create effective barriers -that is, disincentives for candidates -in their campaigning.…”

“…Aside from the vote-attracting value of the 'partyness, localness, presence' triad, candidates may well be able to mobilise functional networks -as teachers, nurses, clerics 8 and so on -and gain more or less discreet 'sponsorship' from professional bodies, so extending the 'reach' of their campaign (André and Depauw, 2019). Moreover, a friend or relative of a candidate, having relocated from the home municipality to a larger town for work-related reasons, could well spread the word on behalf of the candidate.…”

“…Second, in contrast to the main thrust of the personal vote literature (Carey and Shugart, 1995;Crisp et al, 2007;Shugart, 2008), which derives personal voting seeking incentives exclusively from district-level variables -district magnitude or party magnitude -this article adopts a within-district perspective using the municipality as the basic unit of analysis (cf. André and Depauw, 2019). André and Depauw (2018: 269) have noted that 'the growing personal vote literature has rarely examined whether legislators spread their efforts to cultivate personal votes around the district or specialise locally' and they stress the role of district magnitude -the seat allocation per district -in shaping geographical sub-constituencies.…”

Sub-Constituency Campaigning in PR Systems

“…One area of scholarly interest has been the extent to which parties engage in so-called 'subconstituency' campaigning, focusing their resources on specific geographical areas within the electoral district (André & Depauw, 2019;Crisp & Desposato, 2004). Single-member plurality elections tend to provide clear incentives for such sub-constituency campaigning.…”

“…By tracking which ads appeared in which editions, and mapping this onto communities, we are able to assess in which areas parties were campaigning more or less intensively. Second, prior studies on subconstituency campaigning focus on individual candidates running for re-elections (André & Depauw, 2019;Crisp & Desposato, 2004). In contrast, we examine the overall campaign intensity of parties: campaigns in party-centric systems combine party and candidate resources.…”