The Emancipatory Continuity of Religious Emotion

Louchakova-Schwartz, Olga

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-21575-0_5

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Gillham 2020). Phenomenologically, a repeated uncovering of the same mode of passivity decouples appresentations from the idea of God (Louchakova-Schwartz 2020): previously religious, experience may stop feeling as such. By the same token (i.e., by the passivity-disclosing interruption), RE can become connected to a trauma which also causes interruptions, as well as to archaic, negative affective states-hence hostility, violence, revenge, etc., associated with the aftermath of religious experiences.…”

Section: How Should Phenomenology Approach Religious Experience? Regr...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…positive emotions), the process includes uncovering and bringing to awareness emotional memories, including negative affects. Of interest here is not the "dark side" of RE (despite its obvious psychological significance), but the fact that transformation of the enfleshed body towards RE entails a deeply innate meaningful aspect which is associated with the transmutation of emotions (Louchakova-Schwartz 2019).…”

Section: Some Notes On Emotions and The "Dark Side" Of Rementioning

confidence: 99%

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Religious Experience in the First-Person Perspective: The Lived Body and Perception of Reality

Louchakova-Schwartz

2022

Religions

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The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality’s giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and ‘ultimate’ in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl’s analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge.

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Section: How Should Phenomenology Approach Religious Experience? Regr...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Some Notes On Emotions and The "Dark Side" Of Rementioning

confidence: 99%