The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay

Zheng, Junjun; Ren, Tianyu; Gang, Ma; Dong, Jie

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125835

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…The most well-known and most intensively studied multiplayer game is the public goods game (PGG) which extends PD from pairwise interactions to group interactions [18,19,20]. Similarly, additional factors have also been considered in multiplayer games to promote cooperation, such as reputation [21,22,23,24,25,26,27], punishment [28,29,30,31,32,33,34], exclusion [35,36,37], discounting and synergy [25,38], fluctuating population size [39], interdependence of different strategies [40,41], emerging alliance [42,43], environmental feedback [44,45], and reinvestment [46]. The possibility of real-world experiments [47] and applications to real scenarios was also an inspiring force along this research path.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources

Wang

Szolnoki

2022

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources

Wang

Szolnoki

2022

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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“…Like social punishment, exclusion comes in various forms, e.g. peer exclusion [42], pool exclusion [43,44], random sequential exclusion [45], and conditional exclusion [46]. Social exclusion and punishment are good incentive mechanisms for cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Quan¹,

Guo²,

Wang³

2022

J. Stat. Mech.

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The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group are recorded to evaluate their reputations. Those whose reputations fall below a designated threshold are regarded as bad. We study the effects of reputation thresholds, fines, enhancement factors, and exclusion costs on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Simulations show that higher thresholds are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation. An extremely small enhancement factor can induce individuals to cooperate when the threshold is relatively high. Cooperation also appears with smaller enhancement factors for higher fines or lower exclusion costs. These results may expand our understanding of how these two strategies of punishment promote cooperation.

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“…Quan et al observed that the increase in returns to scale with social exclusion significantly reduces the difficulty of cooperation in spatial PGG [33]. Zheng et al introduced the heterogeneity of ability-to-pay to expand the exclusion mechanism [34]. They find that the contribution does not always entail a higher value being better, even though increasing the cost of exclusion can improve the cooperation level under conditions of a strong dilemma.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution dynamics with the switching strategy of punishment and expulsion in the spatial public goods game

Zhuo

Liu²,

Ren³

et al. 2022

New J. Phys.

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Punishment and expulsion are two different strategies to promote cooperation with altruistic sanctions. Among them, expulsion is usually considered more severe and effective than punishment as a strategy to expel the traitor from the field directly. However, frequent expulsions will reduce the number of neighbors around the expellers, and no one can play the subsequent game. Inspired by the fact that people usually take more tolerant punishment measures for most violators, we introduced a switching strategy of punishing most betrayers and expelling a few betrayers in the space public goods game. Unlike the traditional expulsion mechanism, the switching strategy allows the switching strategists to balance the relationship between quickly promoting cooperation and maintaining group stability. Our simulation proves that the switching strategy based on the number of defectors can significantly promote cooperation. Especially when the difficulty intensity is minimal, it can stimulate the emergence of cooperation. In addition, we also determine the optimal switching threshold and the optimal population density under this mechanism. Our work provides a more realistic perspective on the choice of punishment and expulsion, which may help to deepen the understanding of the choice of punishment measures when the number of defectors is high or low.

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The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay

Cited by 9 publications

References 58 publications

Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources

Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources

Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Evolution dynamics with the switching strategy of punishment and expulsion in the spatial public goods game

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