The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown

Johannesen, Niels; Zucman, Gabriel

doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.65

Cited by 217 publications

(344 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

319

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Since the beginning of the financial crisis, and under G20 pressure, a number of tax havens have started exchanging bank information with foreign countries. But they only provide information "upon request:" in practice, the amount of information exchanged remains negligible (Johannesen and Zucman, 2013). Absent automatic information exchange, tax data may well remain an unreliable source to capture the offshore wealth of households.…”

Section: Conclusion: Two Proposals To Improve Official Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?*

Zucman

2013

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Self Cite

392

261

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss dataset and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries' portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that, after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics.

show abstract

Section: Conclusion: Two Proposals To Improve Official Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?*

Zucman

2013

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Self Cite

392

261

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Kudrle (2008) found no discernible impact on the volume of tax haven liabilities. In a more comprehensive study using a panel dataset provided by the Bank for International Settlements, Johannesen and Zucman (2012) find that most tax evaders did not respond to the treaties. 23 Of the minority that did respond, most transferred deposits to other tax havens.…”

Section: Oecd Uncooperative Tax Haven Initiativementioning

confidence: 96%

“…According to Johannesen and Zucman (2012), the large sums recorded in international investment statistics as "belonging" to Panama or the British Virgin Islands suggests that tax evaders routinely use sham corporations domiciled in these jurisdictions as the nominal holders of their bank accounts in Switzerland and Luxembourg.…”

Section: Oecd Uncooperative Tax Haven Initiativementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Johannesen and Zucman (2012) suggest that these have no economic meaning and reflect the desire to reach the desired number of treaties while yielding as few concessions as possible. In 2009, as they point out, haven-haven treaties accounted for almost one third of all treaties concluded by tax havens.…”

Section: Oecd Uncooperative Tax Haven Initiativementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, as of 2013 the OECD has claimed to discern growing political support around the globe for automatic information exchange rather than information exchange upon request. 25 (Johannesen and Zucman, 2012).…”

Section: Oecd Uncooperative Tax Haven Initiativementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Capital Flight, Safe Havens, and Secrecy Jurisdictions

Barry¹

2014

Capital Flight From Africa

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The terms "safe haven" and "secrecy jurisdiction" are arguably more appropriate than "tax haven" or even "offshore financial center" in discussing capital flight. Florida, for example, is thought to be the main destination for capital flight from Latin America, though it is rarely-if ever-listed under either of the last two headings. Most capital flight is thought to reflect the transfer-typically to jurisdictions characterized by strong financial secrecy regulations-of the receipts of plunder, money laundering, and tax evasion. These same jurisdictions are occasionally used by governments to dodge reparations, evade the impact of sanctions, and/or covertly fund political interference in rival states. The paper considers how capital flight safe havens operate. It also reviews the arguments over financial secrecy laws and practices, and considers recent multilateral and unilateral attempts-by the OECD, the EU, the US and others-to counter secrecy abuses.

show abstract

Offshore FDI, tax havens, and productivity: A network analysis

Jha

Awate

2022

Global Strategy Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research summaryMultinational enterprises (MNEs) use tax havens to benefit from international tax arbitrage and increase their capital efficiency. These activities are purported to distort global financial markets, erode national corporate tax bases, and are singularly targeted in the media. Despite this, MNEs continue to increase the dispersion of their tax haven activities by investing in multiple tax havens. We study how this dispersion affects home and host country productivity. We model the inward and outward offshore foreign direct investment (FDI) networks using longitudinal data on 212 countries. We find that increasing dispersion leads to productivity losses at home but productivity gains in the host country. Further, increasing the prominence of home and host countries in the offshore network, by connecting with central, well‐developed tax havens, improves their productivity.Managerial summaryIs offshore FDI routed through tax havens always unproductive to the MNEs' home and host countries? While governments attempt to contain such investments, MNE managers disperse them into multiple tax havens and continue benefitting from tax arbitrage. We show that all offshore FDI is not unproductive. As managers route their investments through multiple tax havens, their home countries may experience productivity losses, but the host countries receive productivity gains. Further, using central, well‐established tax havens bring productivity gains to both home and host countries. We thus show that MNEs' home countries need to reassess their offshore FDI policies since several of them also host these investments. Our paper extends a multilateral perspective on offshore FDI and possible benefits attainable, particularly from central tax havens.

show abstract

The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown

Cited by 217 publications

References 24 publications

The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?*

The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?*

Capital Flight, Safe Havens, and Secrecy Jurisdictions

Offshore FDI, tax havens, and productivity: A network analysis

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About