Discursive Intentionality as Embodied Coping. A Pragmatist Critique of Existential Phenomenology [Forthcoming in Pragmatist Perspectives in Phenomenology, ed. Ondřej Švec and Jakub Čapek. Routledge, 2016] 0. Introduction Despite some intriguing parallels, there has been surprisingly little dialogue between pragmatists and phenomenologists. Though one can easily construct parallels between James and Husserl, or between Dewey and Merleau-Ponty, there are also significant obstacles to a mutually productive conversation between these two philosophical traditions. At work in the background to the present essay is their conflicting attitudes towards science. Though Husserl initially envisioned phenomenology the scientific (though non-naturalistic) foundation of all other sciences, existential phenomenology became deeply critical of what is often called "scientism" (Olafson 2001). Conversely, pragmatists have been largely (though not uniformly) accepting of naturalism, historicism, and the continuity between science and other kinds of human inquiry. Thus, while contemporary pragmatists following Dewey have also been critical of scientism (Margolis 2003), they followed a naturalized, Darwinized Hegel of Dewey and other pragmatists rather than the anti-naturalism of Heidegger or Sartre. At stake in the contest between naturalized Hegelianism and existential phenomenology is whether our philosophical task is to revise our self-understanding in light of the natural and social sciences or to isolate that self-understanding from the sciences. I shall now turn to the recent debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell. ThoughMcDowell is not a pragmatist, his inheritance of key pragmatist themes -in particular, the need to avoid the Myth of the Given and a conception of reason as essentially practical -makes for a