2014
DOI: 10.1515/9780748684847
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The End of Phenomenology

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Cited by 81 publications
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“…12 A different way of putting this point is that whereas phenomenology (on a standard interpretation of Husserl) only explicates the first-person standpoint, pragmatism takes the third-person standpoint as well the first-person standpoint from the very beginning; see the illuminating contrast between Wittgenstein and Heidegger on the one hand, and Dewey on the other, in Godfrey-Smith's (2015) review of Dreyfus and Taylor (2015). I am skeptical that any philosophical method restricted to the first-person standpoint can successfully avoid idealism; for a criticism of phenomenology on precisely these lines, see Sparrow (2014).…”
Section: Sentient Intentionality and Sapient Intentionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…12 A different way of putting this point is that whereas phenomenology (on a standard interpretation of Husserl) only explicates the first-person standpoint, pragmatism takes the third-person standpoint as well the first-person standpoint from the very beginning; see the illuminating contrast between Wittgenstein and Heidegger on the one hand, and Dewey on the other, in Godfrey-Smith's (2015) review of Dreyfus and Taylor (2015). I am skeptical that any philosophical method restricted to the first-person standpoint can successfully avoid idealism; for a criticism of phenomenology on precisely these lines, see Sparrow (2014).…”
Section: Sentient Intentionality and Sapient Intentionalitymentioning
confidence: 99%