The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective

Chafetz, Glenn

doi:10.1080/09636419309347522

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Chafetz (1993), for example, divides the world into "core" and "periphery" states, emphasizing that in the current system, the core constitutes liberal democracies with shared norms and values, which foster international cooperation, tame the security dilemma, and dampen dangers of a nuclear arms race. In addition, democratic states on the periphery may no longer seek nuclear weapons because an increasing number of governments want to reap the benefits of full integration into the core economic-political system.…”

Section: Domestic Determinantsmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation

Singh¹,

Way

2004

Journal of Conflict Resolution

209

216

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Fears of rogue states, withdrawal of cold war-era security guarantees, a falling technological threshold, and availability to terrorist organizations ensure that nuclear weapons proliferation remains a central security issue and that developing an adequate theory of proliferation ranks high on the agenda. A data set on nuclear proliferation is constructed that identifies three different stages on the path to the weaponization of nuclear weapons technology. Hazard models and multinomial logit are used to test theories of nuclear proliferation. Results suggest that nuclear weapons proliferation is strongly associated with the level of economic development, the external threat environment, lack of great-power security guarantees, and a low level of integration in the world economy.Sincetheadventoftheatomicage,nuclearweapons proliferation has been one of the major security issues facing the world. After the end of the cold war, concerns about proliferation have grown rather than subsided: the withdrawal of superpower security guarantees has created incentives for smaller powers to acquire nuclear weapons, a handful of "rogue" states have sought nuclear arms, Pakistan and India have joined the ranks of overt nuclear powers, the technological threshold necessary to develop atomic weapons is in reach of ever more nations, and the possibility of new nuclear powers selling weapons to terrorist organizations has focused concerns. Controversy rages around the world over U.S. plans to build a national missile defense (NMD) system to fend off emerging nuclear threats, and scholars debate whether NMD will fan the fires of proliferation or reduce the incentive for more states to acquire nuclear 859 AUTHORS' NOTE: Thanks to

show abstract

Section: Domestic Determinantsmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation

Singh¹,

Way

2004

Journal of Conflict Resolution

209

216

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Regime type could influence a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Democracies should be less likely to proliferate because they are part of the “core” of the international system and are less worried about their security (e.g., Chafetz 1993). 29 Following standard practice in the proliferation literature, we use a composite measure of regime type from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2009).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disaggregating Noncompliance

Fuhrmann

Berejikian

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors' argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.

show abstract

“…Glenn Chafetz views the modern world as composed of the "core" and "periphery," where the democratic "core" consists of liberal democracies with shared values. Per this hypothesis, the democratic-oriented "core" in the current system tames the security dilemma and makes nuclear proliferation unimportant for other democratic countries [23]. perceive as threats that should be coerced.…”

Section: Review Of the Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

Shymanska¹

2018

IJNS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is no doubt that the NPT regime is far from being equal for all states involved. As the predominant hegemonic power since WWII, the United States plays a major role in deciding the fates of non-great power proliferators. This article tries to find the logical explanation of the phenomenon whereby some nuclear proliferators are absolved regardless of their active accumulation of nuclear arsenals while others are labeled as "rogue states" and ordered to disarm. The article suggests that a particular proliferator's political regime could affect the way in which its state is approached by the U.S., known for its loyalty to democratic values. To check this argument's feasibility, the author analyzes and compares types of political regimes of proliferators-which refer to non-great powers that commenced their nuclear programs since 1964. The study also shows that alignment with the U.S. and presence or absence of hostility toward the West are also influential factors. Along with the proliferator's political regime, these factors determine whether the country is necessarily absolved, required to disarm, or heavily punished. The author finds that the U.S. tends to free democratic proliferators from charges, especially those aligned with the U.S., officially or unofficially. In most cases, the autocratic governments are coerced to give up their proliferation ambitions, though an alignment with the U.S. may work as an extenuating circumstance to render the punishment less harmful. The article aims to demonstrate that the U.S.'s tendency to coerce undemocratic de facto nuclear powers, while avoiding coercion against democratic partners, is not a mere "double standard" or bias, but rather, a part of the U.S.'s strategic policy.

show abstract

The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective

Cited by 11 publications

References 15 publications

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation

Disaggregating Noncompliance

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About