The End of the Indonesian Rebellion

Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing <I>Shari'a</I> Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces

“…Aceh and South Kalimantan joined the Darul Islam The rebellion under the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/ Universal Struggle Charter (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ Permesta) that broke out in West Sumatra in 1958 exacerbated and deepened these conflicts to some degree. 60 In short, in provinces where Islamist movements have a strong presence, state elites affiliated with secular parties adopt shari'a regulations to recalibrate state-society relations that were stirred up with the onset of democratization in 1998. In provinces in which ancien régime figures do not confront Islamist networks in their efforts to maintain power, only a few shari'a regulations or none at all were adopted.…”

War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide

“…Again, this process is in principle clearly observable in terms of the increased co-operation of military branches over time, the more frequent interaction of senior officers it brings about, and the military elite's subsequent use of such a capacity to co-ordinate collective political action. For example, while Indonesia's army had been rife with competition between the army, navy and air force (Kingsbury 2003, 141), fighting rebels in Indonesia (1957–61) involved close co-operation between the country's air force, a sea blockade carried out by Indonesia's navy, and the deployment of infantry units, especially paratroopers (Doeppers 1972; Feith and Lev 1963). Institutionally, this led to the establishment of the Central War Administration, which coordinated military efforts during the state of emergency.…”

Violent Origins of Authoritarian Variation: Rebellion Type and Regime Type in Cold War Southeast Asia

“…Whereas Sukarno had nixed such efforts in 1952 and 1955, the regional rebellions had definitively shifted the political landscape. Since ABRI had quashed the unrest, and non-Javanese parliamentarians had been blamed in part for instigating it, Sukarno became much more beholden to a military that was ‘far stronger and more united’ than before the rebellions erupted (Feith and Lev 1963: 46). Militarization accelerated with Sukarno’s declaration of Guided Democracy (1959–65), as ‘military occupation of the bureaucracy also increased’ (Emmerson 1978: 88).…”