The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement

Lougheed, Kirk

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34503-7

Cited by 18 publications

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“…For instance, Kitcher (1990Kitcher ( , 1993 and Muldoon (2013) argue that diverse opinions among researchers make it more likely that a group will reach the truth in the long run. Lougheed (2020) directly frames these facts as a challenge for conciliationism.…”

Section: The Dilemma From Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

Jackson¹

2021

Epistemic Dilemmas

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What should we do when someone who is smart and well-informed disagrees with us? Should we change our opinion, or hold fast to our previous viewpoint? This question has divided epistemologists, and those working in the epistemology of disagreement have spilled much ink defending various answers. 1 One concept that's been central to the disagreement debate is an epistemic peer. An epistemic peer is roughly someone who is epistemically "on a par" with you-they have similar evidence to you, and are approximately equally reliable, epistemically virtuous, and free from bias about the matter in question. While later, I'll argue that epistemic peerhood need not play a central role in the epistemology of disagreement, it's important for understanding the debate thus far. For now, we'll understand the central question of peer disagreement as: should one alter their opinion when they knowingly encounter a disagreeing epistemic peer?In this chapter, following Buchak (2021), I argue that this central question of peer disagreement presents us with a dilemma; we have good reason to answer both "yes" and "no" to this question. I then offer and motivate a particular solution to that dilemma. This solution revolves around what I call belief-credence dualism, the view that we have two attitudes-beliefs and credencesand neither reduces to the other. In particular, I'll argue that we should alter our credences, but not our beliefs, when encountering an epistemic peer.This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 13.2, I explain how peer disagreement leads to an epistemic dilemma. That is, there's good reason to think that we should both revise and not revise our opinions in response to peer disagreement. In Section 13.3, I offer a solution to this dilemma: if belief-credence dualism is true, this allows for the possibility that we should modify our credences, but not our beliefs, in response to peer disagreement. In Sections 13.4 and 13.5, I motivate this solution; my first motivation relates to the nature of contents and attitudes, and the second relates to epistemic peerhood. In Section 13.6, I address some worries about the view I've proposed, and in Section 13.7, I conclude.

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Section: The Dilemma From Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

Jackson¹

2021

Epistemic Dilemmas

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“…Two main positions have been defended in the literature. Non-conciliationism is the view that two peers can continue to rationally disagree with one another after the disagreement has been disclosed, e.g., (Bergmann 2009;Kelly 2005;Lougheed 2020;Oppy 2010). Conciliationism, on the other hand, holds that each party is required to revise their respective beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, e.g., (Christensen 2007;Feldman 2007;Matheson 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious Disagreement, Mystical Experience, and Doxastic Minimalism: Critical Notice of John Pittard’s Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

Lougheed

2021

Religions

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In his recent book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, John Pittard challenges J.L. Schellenberg’s rejection of mystical experience as worthy of enjoying presumptive doxastic trust for two main reasons. First, Pittard holds that Schellenberg wrongly focuses only on avoiding error while placing no emphasis on gaining truth. I argue that, contra Pittard, Schellenberg’s account nicely balances the competing epistemic goals of gaining truth and avoiding error. Second, Pittard thinks that Schellenberg’s criteria for presumptive trust in that of universality and unavoidability are arbitrary. I counter that Schellenberg’s criteria are not arbitrary since they are the best way of achieving these goals. I conclude that despite not enjoying presumptive doxastic trust, this in itself does not entail that mystical experiences are never trustworthy.

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“…For overviews of recent work on this topic, seeMiller (2019);Wylie (2006). For recent defense, seeElgin (2010);Lougheed (2020).19 For an overview of this psychological literature on disagreement, seeMercier (2011Mercier ( , 2016; Mercier and Landemore (2012);Mercier and Sperber (2011). For specific studies, seeBonner, Baumann, and Dalal (2002);Geil and Moshman (1998);Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996);Kerr and Tindale (2004);Laughlin, Bonner, and Miner (2002);Laughlin and Ellis (1986);Resnick, Salmon, Zeitz, Wathen, and Holowchak (1993).…”

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confidence: 99%

Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

Fleisher

2022

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement

Cited by 18 publications

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Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

Religious Disagreement, Mystical Experience, and Doxastic Minimalism: Critical Notice of John Pittard’s Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

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