The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions

Abstract

In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self‐image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self‐confidence, increasing psychological well‐being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.

Gaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence

“…Seeing that and why this is so helps to more fully articulate the conditions under which a cognitive process such as confabulation is likely to be (or not be) epistemically beneficial, which is helpful both in clarifying the concepts of epistemic benefit (and so epistemic innocence) itself, and when considering possible applications of the notion of epistemic innocence in social and clinical contexts. 23 Suggestions somewhat along these lines have recently been explored by Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett (2018). They consider the question of the epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions (arguing that they can be epistemically innocent), and explicitly consider the resulting possibility that the epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions might imply endorsing different treatment strategies for patients who suffer from memory impairments due to neuropsychological disorders.…”

“…Recent research by Lisa Bortolotti and others has begun challenging the assumption that defective cognitive processes such as delusions and confabulations are blameworthy or categorially epistemically bad (Bortolotti and Cox 2009;Bortolotti 2015;Sullivan-Bissett 2015;Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett 2018). First, it is not clear that individuals who have confabulatory or delusional beliefs are responsible or should be blamed for this.…”

“…This is significant because it suggests that merely condemning such processes, or discouraging them at all costs, may do more harm than good. This point, in turn, may have consequences for the correct way of treating patients who confabulate or are delusional in clinical (and perhaps non-clinical) contexts (Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett 2018).…”

“…I don't take the fact that confabulation in gaslighting fails to be epistemically innocent to be a counter-example to Sullivan-Bissett's point about its epistemically innocent role in confabulation resulting from implicit bias. Sullivan-Bissett follows the literature on epistemic innocence in claiming that confabulation can be beneficial under certain circumstances, not that it always is (Bortolotti and Cox 2009, p. 557;Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett 2018). What the case of gaslighting does illustrate, however, is that whether or not a defective process such as confabulation will confer the cognitive benefits that the epistemic innocence literature typically identifies-namely (i) a greater likelihood of continued reflection and inquiry and (ii) maintenance of a coherent and efficacious self-concept which will, in turn, underwrite further inquiry-will depend in very specific ways on the context in which such faulty cognitions are deployed.…”

“…Her confabulated hypothesis is that the gaslighter's seemingly unusual and inappropriate behavior is, as he himself tells her, not actually unusual but is rather occasioned by shortcomings or failures in herself that she is unable to appreciate. While the victim may initially be unsure about her confabulation in this case, 21 A project that seems to be quite productively afoot in (Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett 2018). 22 It is not crucial to the point I want to make that alternative cognitions be unavailable to confabulators in the context of gaslighting.…”