The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions

Abstract

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.

Depressive delusions

“…In particular, the claim is that, in the context of the disruption of the learning process caused by excessive prediction-error signals, delusions "permit continued engagement with an overwhelming world, and ongoing function in the face of paralyzing difficulty" (Fineberg and Corlett, 2016, p. 73). The claim makes reference to the notion of epistemic innocence that has been applied to motivated delusions and elaborate and systematised delusions in schizophrenia (Bortolotti, 2015(Bortolotti, , 2016. Can this notion be applied also to depressive delusions?…”

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

“…Such delusions have been found to have epistemic benefits that are mediated by their positive effects on wellbeing (Bortolotti 2014).…”

Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría alcances y límites de una perspectiva naturalista para el estudio de los delirios

“…Este tipo de delirios son aquellos que emergen por los beneficios psicológi-cos que confieren al sujeto, siendo respuestas psicológicas activas a conflictos altamente perturbadores. La creencia delirante protegería al sujeto de auto-representaciones negativas que podrían llevar a depresión, baja autoestima y emociones negativas (Bortolotti, 2015;Bell, 2003;Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001;Pavlickova et al, 2013). En estos casos, similares a los de auto-engaño, 9 rastrear el contenido semántico de tales creencias y las posibles explicaciones motivacionales (realizadas en términos de relaciones entre creencias y deseos) resulta importante para comprender la emergencia y mantenimiento de la creencia delirante.…”