The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients

Abstract

This paper argues for two interrelated claims. The first is that the most innovative contribution of Timothy Williamson, Herman Cappelen, and Max Deutsch (a.k.a., the intuition deniers) in the debate about the epistemology of thought experiments is not the denial of intuition and the claim of the irrelevance of experimental philosophy but the claim of epistemological continuity and the rejection of philosophical exceptionalism. The second is that a better way of implementing the claim of epistemological continuity is not Deutsch and Cappelen’s argument view or Williamson’s folk psychological view (i.e., off-line simulation). This is so because while the argument view makes the basis of the relevant classificational judgement evidentially too demanding; the folk psychological view makes it too weak and error-prone to count as an adequate explanation. Drawing from a certain reading of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics that flowers in Miranda Fricker and John McDowell, I argue for the reason-responsiveness view. Like the extant views, the reason-responsiveness view vindicates the claim of epistemological continuity. But unlike the extant views, it does not share those problematic features. Further, I show that the reason-responsiveness view offers a way for champions of the claim of epistemological continuity to resist Avner Baz’s objection to the claim of epistemological continuity and his objection to the philosophical use of thought experiments while taking on board some attractive elements of his view.

High school physics teachers’ perceptions and attitudes towards thought experiments in Indonesia

“…TEs can be used to activate intuition as a basis for learning that is relevant to scientific theories (Bascandziev 2022). TEs can also help students identify the characteristics of a phenomenon based on their previous experiences in their daily activities (Hadzigeorgiou 2016, Irikefe 2022). In addition, TEs can help students to develop creative thinking skills and encourage students to exchange ideas during discussions (Bancong and Song 2020a).…”

Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases

“…In recent times, there have been serious discussions about the evidential status of these judgements, in particular, whether this status is due to their being intuitive(Cappelen 2012(Cappelen , 2014 Deutsch 2015;Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2010;Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009;Irikefe 2020; Williamson 2007). I would set aside this issue in this paper by staying neutral about the evidential nature of these judgements since nothing here hangs on it.Dialectica vol.…”