The equivalence of neo-Darwinism and Walrasian equilibrium: in defense of Organismus economicus

Khalil, Elias L.; Marciano, Alain

doi:10.1007/s10539-009-9172-z

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Such compromises have long been recognized by biologists as the heart of evolutionary change (e.g., Gould, 2002; Khalil, 2009;Khalil & Marciano, 2010). Mayr (1982, p. 589) could have been stating the economist's theory of the second‐best optimal when he wrote “Since the phenotype as a whole is the target of selection, it is impossible to improve simultaneously all aspects of the phenotype to the same degree.”…”

Section: Proposition 2: Mental Accounting In Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental accounting, heuristics, and the second‐best: Solving the calculator‐jacket puzzle

Khalil

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper conceives mental accounting along Kahneman's “mental economy,” specifically as a heuristic. This mental‐accounting‐as‐heuristic conception allows us to solve the calculator‐jacket puzzle. The opportunity cost of time is not constant but roughly varies with the variation of the item's value. As the value of the item rises, the decision maker (DM) should be more attentive. However, the measurement of the opportunity cost of time at each point of purchase is cognitively costly. To reduce such cost, the DM adopts a heuristic, the item's price itself, as a rough proxy of the varying opportunity cost of time.

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Section: Proposition 2: Mental Accounting In Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental accounting, heuristics, and the second‐best: Solving the calculator‐jacket puzzle

Khalil

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…4. Biologists who use the foraging theory pioneered by Eric Charnov (e.g., 1976; see Stephens & Krebs, 1986) or who employ the tools of "bioeconomics" (e.g., Ghiselin, 1974; see also Tullock, 1971Tullock, , 1994Khalil & Marciano, 2010) already use cost-benefit calculations, that is, rational choice. A few biologists have recently taken the first step to recognizing openly the relevance of rationality to the understanding of behavior or organisms (e.g., Vermeij, 2004;Hurley & Nudds, 2006).…”

Section: The Russell Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is in contradistinction of the view that organisms do not make decisions, but rather behave according to rules selected by natural selection. This view can be called the "Organismus automaton hypothesis", which is at the core of neo-Darwinism (see Khalil & Marciano, 2010). This paper commences with a sharp distinction between the two hypotheses via the distinction between the optimization method, which specifies the best outcome, and the transformation function, which translates inputs to outputs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is rationality a cognitive faculty?

Khalil

2023

F1000Res

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Rationality cannot be a form of intelligence or any other cognitive faculty such as memory, language faculty, mathematical skill, and so on. To establish this thesis, this paper uses a distinction from set theory, namely, the distinction between “binary relators” and “binary operators”. Rationality acts as a binary relator in the sense that it is an optimization method, while cognitive ability acts as a binary operator in the sense that it is a transformational function. Rationality as an optimization method (binary relator) does not differ from the neo-Darwinian notion of natural selection: either method seeks to find the best choice or fit trait given the constraints. A cognitive faculty as a transformational function (binary operator) simply translates inputs into outputs. The distinction between rationality and cognitive functions has wide-ranging implications regarding the theory of evolution.

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“…Similarly, the replicator dynamic has done a lot to justify the centrality of the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept in game theory (Mailath 1998, Vromen 2009. Khalil and Marciano (2010) argue that evolutionary economists who turn to (neo-Darwinian) evolutionary biology in order to get away from mechanistic Walrasian general equilibrium theory will not find what they are looking for. In fact, neo-Darwinism and Walrasian equilibrium rest on the same formal model (Joosten 2006).…”

Section: Replicator Dynamics Without Replicators?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous Economic Evolution: A Different View on Darwinizing Evolutionary Economics

Vromen¹

2011

The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology

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are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine. #1015 2 2. The received view on Darwinizing evolutionary economics Attempts to Darwinize evolutionary economics (cf. Aunger 2000) have met resistance from within the field of evolutionary economics(Witt 2004, 2007; Bünstorff 2006; Cordes 2006; Schubert 2009). But now it seems the field has reached an agreement about what sort of Darwinism is acceptable and perhaps even necessary (Hodgson 2010). In a nutshell, he crux of this "received view" is that the three Darwinian principles, variation, replication and selection should be given an abstract and general interpretation (cf. also Aldrich et al. 2008, Hodgson and Knudsen 2010). A Generalized Darwinism is based on a recognition of ontological communalities between the biological and the economic (or, more broadly, the cultural) domain, 2 while acknowledging that there are also huge differences in the ("details" of the) mechanisms that bring about variation, replication and selection in the two domains. It is acknowledged, for example, that in the cultural domain intentionality plays an important role in the production of variation and in selection, that replication is often mere retention of information and that, if there is genuine transmission of information from the one cultural interactor to the other, the fidelity typically is lower than in genetic inheritance. By identifying variation, replication and selection as the key ingredients in Darwinism, proponents of Generalized Darwinism such as notably Hodgson and Knudsen (2006, 2010) seem to place themselves in the "classical" tradition of attempts to give generic descriptions of Darwinian evolution through natural selection (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Important forerunners in this tradition are Lewontin (1970) and Lewontin (1985). In this tradition, variation, heredity and differential fitness are seen as separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for evolutionary change through natural selection to occur. Hodgson and Knudsen also argue, however, that further refinements and clarifications of these Darwinian principles are needed. One such refinement is the requirement that interactors and replicators are to be identified. By imposing this requirement, Hodgson and Knudsen put themselves also in another tradition of attempts to give generic descriptions of Darwinian evolution pioneered by Dawkins (1976) and further developed by Hull (1980): the replicator approach (Godfrey-Smith 2009). The replicator approach insists that for some evolutionary process to qualify as Darwinian there must be replicators involved. Replicators are entities that induce the production of copies of themselves. The paradigm examples of replicators in biological evolution are genes. Hodgson and Knudsen argue that in the economic domain, habits (of individual persons) and routines (of organizations such as firms) are replicators. Hull defines "interactors" as cohesive entities that interact with each other, causing reproduction to be differential. Individual organisms are pa...

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The equivalence of neo-Darwinism and Walrasian equilibrium: in defense of Organismus economicus

Cited by 7 publications

References 45 publications

Mental accounting, heuristics, and the second‐best: Solving the calculator‐jacket puzzle

Mental accounting, heuristics, and the second‐best: Solving the calculator‐jacket puzzle

Is rationality a cognitive faculty?

Heterogeneous Economic Evolution: A Different View on Darwinizing Evolutionary Economics

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