The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power

Appelbaum, Elie

doi:10.1016/0304-4076(82)90006-9

Cited by 378 publications

(198 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Some authors -reviewed by Appelbaum (1982) and Bresnahan (1989) -consider that this simple framework encompasses a variety of non-competitive pricing behaviors. In this section, we follow the Cournot-Nash conjecture and consider the production level of competitors as fixed while firm  is choosing its optimal production level.…”

Section: Input Demands With Cournot Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle

Koebel¹,

Laisney²

2014

Annals of Economics and Statistics

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Abstract. This paper studies the aggregate substitution and expansion effects triggered by changes in input prices in a context where firms supply a homogeneous commodity and compete in quantities à la Cournot. We derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium and show that this condition also ensures that the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle is satisfied in the aggregate at the Cournot equilibrium, although it may not be satisfied at the firm level.

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Section: Input Demands With Cournot Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle

Koebel¹,

Laisney²

2014

Annals of Economics and Statistics

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“…There are two methods to identify the parameter l. The first method is a production theoretic approach following the work of Appelbaum (1982) where the demand equation and supply relation are estimated together with factor demand equations. The second method identifies the market power parameter through rotation of the demand curve (Bresnahan, 1982;Lau 1982).…”

Section: Conceptual Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power in Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce: Community Supported Agriculture Farms

2005

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Abstract:CSA farms establish a loyal customer base and, potentially, market power. A new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach and survey data from Northeast CSA farms are used to determine whether CSA farms have market power and the extent to which they exercise their market power. Results suggest CSA farms exert about two percent of their potential monopoly power. Abstract: CSA farms establish a loyal customer base and, potentially, market power. A new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach and survey data from Northeast CSA farms are used to determine whether CSA farms have market power and the extent to which they exercise their market power. Results suggest CSA farms exert about two percent of their potential monopoly power. Keywords

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“…Concerning price and output determination, literature distinguishes between pure competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and pure monopoly. Since there is antitrust law in most developed countries, the most common forms of the market structure are monopolistic competition (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977) and oligopoly (Appelbaum, 1982). Nevertheless, the bargaining power of the grocery retailers needs to be assessed from the buyer's point of view, i.e.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Concentration and Profitability of the Grocery Retailers in Central Europe

Špička¹

2016

CEBR

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Slovakia. The market concentration was measured by CR 4 ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the GRS index. Data covered the period 2010 -2015. The secondary data came from the Euromonitor International and Bureau van Dijk databases. The results showed that the market structure of the Central European grocery retailers has mostly a character of asymmetric oligopoly. The pairwise correlation did not reveal any strong relationship between the market power and profitability of the grocery retailers. The Central European grocery market is controlled by strong national retail chains and multinational companies which operate modern grocery retail formats. However, traditional grocery retailers are still popular in Hungary while traditional individual grocers in other countries are disappearing or gradually joining the networking system based on franchising.

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The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power

Cited by 378 publications

References 9 publications

Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle

Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle

Market Power in Direct Marketing of Fresh Produce: Community Supported Agriculture Farms

Market Concentration and Profitability of the Grocery Retailers in Central Europe

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