The EU counter-radicalisation strategy as “business as usual”? How European political routine resists radical religion

Abstract

The emergence of an EU counter-radicalisation (CR) strategy has challenged the usual reluctance of European institutions to tackle value-loaded issues. This article examines whether this new policy alters EU policy-making and especially its approach to religion. It illuminates, first, the triggers of such a CR strategy (traumatic events, popular expectations and international influences). It then shows how the shift of CR from foreign to domestic EU affairs leads to the acknowledgement of religion as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and to the involvement of a greater number of political, bureaucratic and civil society actors. Still, usual patterns of EU public action apply to reduce the controversial potential of CR: circumscription to a legal and bureaucratic logic, institutional burden-sharing, delegation to member states and civil society, hollowing of the normative content of religion. In conclusion, CR has sparked a new EU policy field but has not radically shaken the routine of European politics.

Current Trends Of Extremism In Russia

“…The structure of extremist crimes includes such offenses as public appeals to extremist activity The number of mass riots (from 2 to 17), incitement of hatred or hostility, as well as abasement of human dignity (+36.5 %), public appeals to extremist activity (+32.4 %) and organizing an extremist Another dangerous manifestation of extremism is destructive activity carried out in relation to minors (Foret & Markoviti, 2020;Gielen, 2017). The scale of the problem highlights several dimensions of such activity: football fan extremist movements; "death groups" focused on suicidal ideation; school shooting (the use of firearms on the territory of educational institutions, often escalating into mass killings); cultivation of criminal subculture; totalitarian and occult religious associations and organizations (sects) as well as various international terrorist organizations (Polshikov & Latyshev, 2020); religious associations violating rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of families and children, widely using cross-border and transnational connections, the global potential of the Internet for involvement in criminal activities (Fernandez et al, 2018;Osipenko & Soloviev, 2019).…”

Fundamental right or political value? The evolution of ‘freedom of religion or belief’ in the European Union’s legitimation and public action

“…Meanwhile, external incentives have also faded away, as FoRB has lost some of its gloss in the global sphere. The threat of religious terrorism has reinforced the securitisation of religion and the prioritisation of safety over freedom (Foret and Markoviti 2019). Canada, a pioneer on the topic, closed its Office of Religious Freedom in March 2016 (Lee 2016).…”

“…It highlights in particular the influence of the US, where the term 'politics of religious freedom' (Saba 2015) was originally coined. An alternative way to comprehend this evolution is to see the emergence of FoRB as a value as part of a broader rise of 'European values' in the EU's legitimisation since the early 2000s (See François and Vargovčíková 2020;Foret and Calligaro, 2018).…”