The Eurolaw Game: Some Deductions from a Saga

Rawlings, Richard

doi:10.2307/1410310

Cited by 44 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…those needing quick financial compensation or wishing to protect a market position. However, delay allows its use as a litigation strategy to weaken another litigant's position or to secure injunctive relief from a disliked domestic law, thus allowing the litigant a period of grace from the law pending resolution of the dispute (Rawlings 1993). This benefits actors with interests exclusively in one State as any injunctive relief will fully protect their position as it will apply across the whole of their market, the national territory.…”

Section: The Arenas Of Eu Judicial Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The reference points of EU judicial politics

Chalmers¹,

Chaves²

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

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Explanations of the dynamics of EU judicial politics must also account for its incidence, namely when and in which sectors litigation of EU law and ECJ judgments occur. This incidence, it is suggested relies on a relationship between three arenas, those for norm-setting, litigation and judgments, as events in each of these arena conditions possibilities for action in the others. This paper analyses the relationship between these arenas through a study of all 2007-9 preliminary rulings and finds EU judicial politics characterised by two predominant dynamics. 'Patrol norms' dedicated to securing common policies give rise to low salient judgments dominated by transnational enterprise and national administration litigation. 'Thickly evaluative norms' are concerned with articulating certain values. Dominated by litigation by domestic undertakings and non-commercial actors, these norms generate the Court's salient judgments.

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Section: The Arenas Of Eu Judicial Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The reference points of EU judicial politics

Chalmers¹,

Chaves²

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…The approach developed by European institutions also suited the interests of private actors, which realized that they could use the legal sphere to achieve ends that could not be achieved through the ordinary policy process. The latter engaged in 'Eurolitigation' strategies as a way of challenging domestic policies (Rawlings 1993;Mattli and Slaughter 1996;McCown 2005). In the joined cases Lucazeau v. Sacem (ECJ 110/88 and 241/88), which represented a serious challenge to French copyright policies, 3 several discotheque owners accused the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM), the French authors' society, of charging excessively high rates and refusing to grant licences for certain sections of its repertory.…”

Section: The Origins Of Eu Intervention In the Copyright Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Copyright in the EU: droit d'auteur or right to copy?

Littoz-Monnet¹

2006

Journal of European Public Policy

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The European Union (EU) began to develop copyright policies as early as the 1980s even though no competence existed in the Treaties. The formulation of EU policies in the area of intellectual property has been the object of heated policy debates between a diverse range of stakeholders, at the heart of which are some fundamentally different conceptions about the nature of intellectual property and its role in the information economy. Thus, EU copyright policy is the complex outcome of the interplay between subnational, national and EU-level policy actors that were all trying to 'frame the policy debate' in order to control policy and policy outcomes. This article explains why certain policy choices were made in the formulation of EU policies, when several policy options were, in principle, available. It argues, essentially, that insofar as the locus of decision-making shifted towards the EU level as a result of European institutions' use of their agenda-setting and judiciary powers, policy outcomes were, in a second stage, more likely to favour liberal policy solutions.

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“…Litigants' goals within litigation, therefore, are twofold: to win and to keep costs to a minimum. If national courts overwhelmingly implement ECJ decisions, and provided there is no benefit to either side in prolonging adjudication -as was the case with the preliminary references in regard to the British Sunday trading laws (Rawlings, 1993) -a new opportunity to cut costs arises for litigants.…”

Section: H1mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Preliminary Reference Process

Nyikos

2003

European Union Politics

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A B S T R A C TLitigant desistment, i.e. voluntary litigant implementation of an ECJ ruling in a preliminary reference case that preempts the necessity for a national court decision, is a commonyet often overlooked -strategic behavior new to the study of the ECJ, national courts and the preliminary reference process. The hypotheses directed at predicting and investigating when such litigant behavior occurs are an outgrowth of the 'implementation prejudice' that national courts will overwhelmingly apply ECJ decisions in their rulings, which changes the opportunity structures of litigants. Understanding when litigants desist not only expands general knowledge concerning the underinvestigated implementation stage but also arguably could have important implications for our understanding of the evolution of 'high' court legitimacy.

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The Eurolaw Game: Some Deductions from a Saga

Cited by 44 publications

References 8 publications

The reference points of EU judicial politics

The reference points of EU judicial politics

Copyright in the EU: droit d'auteur or right to copy?

The Preliminary Reference Process

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