The European Central Bank

The Limits of Transparency: Expert Knowledge and Meaningful Accountability in Central Banking

“…We illustrate our argument by discussing ECB accountability, suggesting that what is needed is an independent community of experts who can help citizens in holding it accountable. In so doing, we complement other studies that examine the independence and accountability of the ECB (Braun 2020;Curtin 2017;De Haan and Eijffinger 2000;Howarth and Loedel 2005;Jabko 2009). Meaningful accountability and the challenge of expert knowledge One of the main characteristics of modern societies is 'hyper-specialization' (Millgram 2015).…”

Does politics drive conflict in central banks’ committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus

“…Based on the rational partisanship theory, left-wing parties and governments are more likely to give pride of place to expansionary policies aimed at keeping unemployment low at the expense of higher deficits and inflation (Hibbs, 1977). This suggests that left-wing governments are more likely to contest ECB policy in light of the price stability mandate assigned to the ECB and its German-inspired hawkish approach to monetary policy (Howarth and Loedel, 2003: 52). Similar contestation is to be expected when national governments have a strong anti-EU inclination: national governments with an anti-EU inclination may be more likely to contest the sovereignty losses associated with the activities of EU institutions, such as the ECB. H1 : NCBs’ tendency to disagree with the ECB’s policy stance increases the higher the left-wing inclination of the domestic governments that appoint them. H2 : NCBs’ tendency to disagree with the ECB’s policy stance increases the higher the anti-EU inclination of the domestic governments that appoint them.In addition to the direct impact of partisanship and support for the EU, it is plausible to hypothesize that NCBs’ preferences might be influenced by the interaction of these two dimensions.…”

“…These findings suggest that central bankers’ position-taking is also shaped by domestic political considerations, challenging the ECB’s projected image of itself as an institution whose members are driven only by Euro-area economic consideration and are impermeable to domestic political pressures (Issing et al., 2001: Chapter 9; see also Howarth and Loedel, 2003). Our analysis thus contributes to the understanding of the extent of politicization of central banks, especially at a time when political pressures on central banks have increased around the world (McPhilemy and Moschella, 2019), and it provides building blocks for research investigating the consequences of disagreement on the implementation of monetary policy choices.…”

El Banco Central Europeo. Aspectos jurídicos, institucionales y políticos

“…59 Por ello, se ha señalado que dicho banco ha hecho las veces de "policía", a través de su claro mensaje de ortodoxia fiscal, y posiblemente el de "juez" si decide sancionar a los infractores por la vía de "apretar" su política monetaria. 60 A partir de la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Ámsterdam en mayo de 1999, la gobernación económica del eurosistema se ha vuelto extraordinariamente compleja. Entre sus principales actores se encuentran la Comisión Europea, el Ecofin y el BCE por el lado comunitario, así como el "eurogrupo" donde están representados los gobiernos de los Estados miembros.…”