2008
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9310-1
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The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Such conclusions are consistent with studies pointing out that the influence of EU institutions on legislative outcomes depends on the decision-making rules that are applicable in each policy area (Crombez and Hix, 2011; König, 2008; Napel and Widgren, 2007; Thomson, 2008). Specifically, in their analysis on the power of the Council, Commission and EP under different institution rules, Thomson and Hosli (2006) conclude that, ‘[c]ompared with the qualified majority voting variant of the consultation procedure, the Commission appears to be weaker and the Parliament stronger under the co-decision procedure’ (p. 414).…”
Section: The Potential For a Role Of Europarties’ Pledges In The Pre-supporting
confidence: 91%
“…Such conclusions are consistent with studies pointing out that the influence of EU institutions on legislative outcomes depends on the decision-making rules that are applicable in each policy area (Crombez and Hix, 2011; König, 2008; Napel and Widgren, 2007; Thomson, 2008). Specifically, in their analysis on the power of the Council, Commission and EP under different institution rules, Thomson and Hosli (2006) conclude that, ‘[c]ompared with the qualified majority voting variant of the consultation procedure, the Commission appears to be weaker and the Parliament stronger under the co-decision procedure’ (p. 414).…”
Section: The Potential For a Role Of Europarties’ Pledges In The Pre-supporting
confidence: 91%
“…It is also the longest procedure (see Rasmussen and Toshkov 2011), and this can be a problem for proposals that the Commission would like to see adopted quickly. Accordingly, we assume that Commission prefers delegation over co-decision, even in the light of the findings that -on average -the Commission's policy preferences are closer to those of the EP than to those of the Council (Napel and Widgren 2008), 10 and we submit that:…”
Section: Distributive Bargaining Theory Applied To Comitologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They conclude that the more recent move to QMV for appointing the Commission, combined with the ability of the member states and the EP to amend Commission proposals, has turned the EU into a more majoritarian political system. Napel and Widgre´n (2008) present another exception to the exogenous Commission assumption, and find that Commissioners duplicate the policy preferences of Council members. This seems to contradict empirical studies (Ko¨nig et al, 2007;Rasmussen, 2003) that suggest the Commission and EP exhibit a much less conflictual relationship than the Commission and Council.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 81%