2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571383.001.0001
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The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland

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Cited by 80 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…In Northern Ireland, human rights as a concept are far from politically neutral, and have not been fully embraced by formal politics and political structures in the province. The European Convention on Human Rights had minimal impact during the years of the Troubles (Dickson, 2010). One of the key human rights mechanisms envisioned in the GFA, the Bill of Rights, has been all but forgotten.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Northern Ireland, human rights as a concept are far from politically neutral, and have not been fully embraced by formal politics and political structures in the province. The European Convention on Human Rights had minimal impact during the years of the Troubles (Dickson, 2010). One of the key human rights mechanisms envisioned in the GFA, the Bill of Rights, has been all but forgotten.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lack of legal knowledge and diligence in submitting claims also kept various controversial practices away from the Court. Cases alleging discrimination in education, employment and housing, for instance, failed at an early stage due to poor legal representation (Dickson, : 46‐47). When well‐presented claims were submitted, the ECHR system proved largely ineffective as a tool to challenge security policies.…”
Section: Conflict‐lawyering and The Echr In Turkeymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When well‐presented claims were submitted, the ECHR system proved largely ineffective as a tool to challenge security policies. The Court's approach to internment, for example, has been criticized for causing “[i]nestimable damage…to the credibility of the Convention” (Dickson, : 363).…”
Section: Conflict‐lawyering and The Echr In Turkeymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…the court's decision, alas, is the epitome of how deferential, even as recently as the mid-1990s, courts could be to police and government anti-terrorist policies.' 49 In a similar vein, John Jackson has characterized the judiciary as having a`rather compliant' attitude towards emergency law, displaying little willingness to criticize or curtail the emergency powers, consistently denying themselves the space to use their undoubted discretion [for instance, to exclude confessional evidence, to reinvigorate the judges' rules which had`lain dormant' or to assert the rights of solicitors vis-a Á-vis their clients]`in view of the need to adhere to the will of parliament.' 50 In seeking to better understand this compliant or deferential attitude amongst the judiciary towards the will of Parliament, reflected both in our own interviews and their written judgments, we have examined some of the comparative literature on courts and judicial behaviour.…”
Section: Performing For Parliamentmentioning
confidence: 99%