The European Union and National Human Rights Institutions

Current trends and challenges in comparative constitutional law: In search of a new equilibrium

“…Another reason for ending the false dichotomy between legislators and courts is the emergence of a plethora of new institutions, a 'new fourth branch' 31 or a new 'ephorate', 32 consisting of institutions variously referred to as 'guarantor institutions', 33 'integrity institutions' 34 or 'regulatory institutions'. 35 Although they do not represent a novelty in the comparative panorama, 36 they have nevertheless assumed relevance above all thanks to the most recent process of constitutionalization that has affected them first of all in contexts such as South Africa, 37 Kenya and India, and then spread to other legal systems, such as those of Latin America and Europe, 38 also under the influence of supranational and international institutions. 39 More generally, guarantor institutions are an expression of the phenomenon that, in contemporary democracies, 'the Montesqueian tradition cannot provide sufficient guarantees for constitutional democracy in a political world where political parties play central roles'.…”

Explaining institutional strength: the case of national human rights institutions in Europe and its Neighbourhood

“…Existing literature provides compelling evidence that socialisation effects can be at work in the case of EU members and that, for recent members and candidate countries, conditionality tied to EU membership may also an important factor explaining states NHRI diffusion (Carver 2011;de Beco 2007;Pegram 2010;Wouters et al 2013). In the case of the ENP, socialisation and conditionality are less effective and conducive to policy and institutional change, in particular when the promise of EU membership is absent (Schimmelfennig 2012;Sedelmeier 2007).…”